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ABSTRACT
Big data’s predictive algorithms have the potential to 
revolutionize the criminal justice system. They can make far more 
accurate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause, thus increasing both the efficiency and the fairness of the 
system, since fewer innocent people will be stopped and searched. 
However, three significant obstacles remain before the 
criminal justice system can formally use predictive algorithms to 
help make these determinations. First, we need to ensure that neither 
the algorithms nor the data used are based on improper factors, such 
as the race of the suspect. Second, under Fourth Amendment law, 
individualized suspicion is an essential element of reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. This means that either the predictive
algorithms must be designed to take individualized suspicion into 
account, or the predictive algorithms can only be used as one factor 
in determining whether the legal standard has been met, forcing 
police and judges to combine the algorithms’ results with 
individualized factors. And finally, the legal standards themselves 
must be quantified so that police and judges can use the numerical 
predictions of big data in their reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause determinations.
These obstacles are not insurmountable. And if the necessary 
changes are made, the criminal justice system will become far more 
transparent, since the factors the algorithms take into consideration 
will necessarily be reviewable by judges and the general public 
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alike. Furthermore, setting a quantified likelihood for reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause will allow us to engage in a healthy 
debate about what those numbers ought to be, and it will also ensure 
conformity across different jurisdictions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................948 
I.  THE PROMISE OF BIG DATA: INCREASED ACCURACY .............952 
A. Predictive Algorithms and Policing.................................954 
B. Predictive Algorithms as Background Data.....................958 
C. Predictive Algorithms as Formal Factors ........................959 
D. Predictive Algorithms Elsewhere in the Criminal 
Justice System..................................................................965 
II.  CHALLENGES TO USING PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS ................969 
A. Detecting the Racial Biases in the Predictive 
Algorithms .......................................................................969 
1. Direct and Indirect Use of Forbidden Factors .........970 
2.  Preexisting Biases in the Underlying Data ...............980 
B. Ensuring the Computer Looks for Individualized 
Suspicion..........................................................................983 
C. Changing the Legal Standards .........................................986 
III. MAKING BIG DATA WORK IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM ....................................................................................993 
A. Transparent Algorithms and Data Sets ............................994 
B. Quantifying the Legal Standards .....................................999 
1. Setting a Number.......................................................999 
2. Using the Number....................................................1009 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1016 
INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system has always been concerned with 
predictions.1 Police officers on patrol predict which suspects are 
1. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 17-18 (2007) (“The truth is, most 
criminal justice determinations rest on probabilistic reasoning. The jury’s verdict at 
trial, for instance, is nothing more than a probabilistic determination of prior fact. So 
is a police officer’s determination whether there is sufficient cause to search or 
arrest a suspect; a judge’s decision whether a suspect was coerced to confess; or 
even a forensic laboratory’s conclusion regarding a DNA match—or DNA 
exoneration.”). Professor Harcourt goes on to draw a sharp distinction between the 
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engaged in criminal activity in order to determine where to focus 
their investigative efforts. Magistrates deciding whether to grant a 
search warrant predict the odds that contraband will be found based 
on the facts presented in a warrant application. Judges conducting 
bail hearings predict the chances that a defendant will return to court 
for trial, and sentencing judges try to determine whether a convicted 
defendant is likely to reoffend if he is given a nonincarceration 
sentence. 
Since the inception of our criminal justice system, law 
enforcement officers and judges have relied primarily on experience, 
training, intuition, and common sense in making their predictions.2 In 
response, courts have crafted broad standards to accommodate these 
subjective judgments and allow for flexibility in application. For
example, police officers may briefly detain an individual if they 
reasonably believe that “criminal activity may be afoot,”3 while 
magistrates should issue a warrant if “a man of prudence and caution 
[believes] that the offense has been committed.”4
The broad, flexible nature of these standards is no accident: 
They have been intentionally left imprecise by generations of courts. 
One reason is the nearly infinite number of different facts that could 
arise in any criminal case, which make hard and fast rules rather 
impractical.5 But the main reason these rules have been kept 
necessary probabilistic decisions that are inherent in the criminal justice system and 
what he calls the “actuarial” determinations that are derived from “statistical 
correlations between group traits and group criminal offending rates,” which should 
be avoided if at all possible. Id. at 18. 
2. There were certainly scattered examples of statistical prediction 
instruments before the big data era. Statistical prediction methods were developed as 
early as 1935 to determine the likelihood of a prisoner’s success if paroled; by the 
late twentieth century similar statistical prediction instruments were being used by 
dozens of states. Id. at 1, 7-9. Likewise, in the 1970s and 1980s federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration officers used “drug courier profiles” to determine 
which passengers at airports to investigate. Id. at 15-16. But the rise of big data, with 
its vast amounts of information and vastly powerful methods of processing that data, 
brings the promise (or the threat) of a true revolution in the sophistication and the 
proliferation of these tools.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). Occasionally 
specific, recurring fact patterns lead to more specific applications of these rules: For 
example, police officers know that if they observe a suspect fleeing from them while 
in a high crime neighborhood, those two factors result in reasonable suspicion that 
the suspect has committed a crime. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25
(2000). 
5. The Supreme Court has explained that “probable cause is a fluid 
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
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ambiguous is that police and courts have historically lacked the 
necessary tools to evaluate the accuracy of their predictions with any 
precision. Thus, state actors have been forced to rely on their own 
subjective beliefs and anecdotal evidence in making their 
predictions.6
All of that is now changing. Modern methods of data collection 
and analysis commonly known as “big data” are providing police 
and judges with tools that can predict future behavior with greater 
precision than ever before.7 These tools hold out the promise of 
increased fairness and greater objectivity at many of the critical 
decision points in our criminal justice system. But despite the 
potential of big data tools, three significant obstacles potentially bar 
their effective incorporation into the criminal justice system.
First, we need to ensure that the tools of big data are not hard-
wired to produce discriminatory results. If the predictive algorithms 
consider race or religion as a factor, then using these algorithms to 
predict behavior is unacceptable (and illegal) no matter how much 
they may increase accuracy. Similarly, if the algorithms themselves 
were developed based on past discriminatory practices, we need to 
develop new algorithms based on better data.
Second, Fourth Amendment law mandates that decisions to 
stop or search a suspect be based at least in part on individualized 
suspicion. Because big data involves processing large amounts of 
information, its algorithms frequently generate predictions based on 
broad generalizations rather than specific conduct. Thus, in their 
current form, these algorithms cannot on their own form the basis for 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
And finally, the current legal standards that govern police 
officers and judges are imprecise and subjective. Courts have 
deliberately created them to be imprecise and seem to have every 
intention of keeping them that way. Unfortunately, these nebulous 
standards are a poor fit for big data’s highly precise and quantitative 
tools.
These obstacles are not insurmountable barriers. Big data 
algorithms can be structured so that they are truly race neutral and 
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
6. For example, a magistrate might reasonably conclude that a defendant 
who does not have a steady job seems less likely to come back to court on her own; 
furthermore, last month the magistrate remembers releasing a defendant who did not 
have a steady job and sure enough, she did not appear for her court date. 
7. See infra Part I.
Quantifying Criminal Procedure 951
take into account individualized conduct when making their 
calculations. But in order to ensure that they meet these 
requirements, the factors they apply must be transparent to judges. In 
other words, it is not sufficient for reviewing courts to know that 
these algorithms are working; the courts must also understand 
exactly how the methods work to ensure that those methods meet the 
appropriate legal standards.8 And although courts have historically 
been reluctant to attach specific numbers to the relevant legal 
standards, there is no doctrinal barrier to doing so. Courts may be 
more willing to take this step as they come to realize that big data 
offers highly precise and quantitative tools that can create not only 
better accuracy but also greater transparency in our criminal system. 
This Article seeks to harmonize the analytical world of big data 
with the legal world of criminal justice. If those who design the big 
data tools can ensure the transparency of their algorithms and 
databases, not only will these tools become more palatable to the 
courts, but the transparency of these calculations will simultaneously 
improve the transparency of the criminal justice system. Moreover, if 
courts embrace the use of numerically quantifiable data, not only will 
we achieve greater accuracy in the administration of justice, but we 
will also achieve greater clarity of the process. 
Part I of this Article discusses the ways in which big data can 
increase the accuracy of our criminal justice system.9 Part II 
addresses the challenges involved in the use of big data.10 Part III 
explains how these challenges can be overcome by requiring 
heightened transparency of big data’s algorithms and databases and 
by introducing quantifiable standards into our criminal justice 
system.11 The Article concludes by positing that big data tools, if 
properly designed and used, can dramatically improve both the 
accuracy and transparency of our criminal justice system. 
8. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable 
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 319-20 (2012). Unfortunately, as these algorithms 
become more accurate, they also become more complicated, and the databases they 
use become even larger and more detailed, making them less comprehensible to the 
average police officer or judge. We will consider this problem in more detail in 
Section III.A.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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I. THE PROMISE OF BIG DATA: INCREASED ACCURACY
“Big data” is the practice of accumulating extraordinarily large 
amounts of information from a variety of different sources and then 
processing that information using statistical analysis.12 The results of 
these analyses are termed “mechanical predictions” in contrast with 
subjective “clinical judgments,” which are based on the individual 
decision-maker’s past experience and knowledge.13
Private companies have been using big data for over a decade 
to predict consumer behavior. Retailers use it to determine and 
change shopping habits.14 Insurance companies rely on big data to try 
to identify the safest drivers and healthiest people in their customer 
pool.15 Banks and credit agencies use big data to determine the 
likelihood that a potential borrower is a credit risk.16 And all sorts of 
companies buy and sell this data to each other, seeking to mine it for 
information about their customers that they can use for economic 
advantage.17
In the criminal law context, mechanical predictions can be used 
to assist decision-makers in making the judgment calls that are 
integral to the criminal justice system. The extraordinary promise of 
applying big data to the criminal justice system is based on two
12. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable 
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352-53 (2015). 
13. See William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A 
Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000).
14. A famous Forbes story reported that Target had used big data from 
seemingly random purchasing to determine that a minor customer was pregnant and 
then sent the customer coupons for pregnancy and new baby items before the 
teenager had notified her parents that she was pregnant. See Kashmir Hill, How 
Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/ how-
target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#3363735834c6 
[https://perma.cc/BA2Q-8HK4]. 
15. See Brian Fung, The Big Data of Bad Driving, and How Insurers Plan 
to Track Your Every Turn, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/04/the-big-data-of-bad-driving-and-how-insurers-
plan-to-track-your-every-turn/ [https://perma.cc/999Q-K9TZ].
16. See EVA WOLKOWITZ & SARAH PARKER, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL:
HARNESSING DATA TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET 11 (2015), http:// 
www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Big_Data_Big_Potential.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DY42-K2Q7].
17. See Meta S. Brown, When and Where to Buy Consumer Data (and 12 
Companies Who Sell It), FORBES (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-consumer-data-and-12-companies-
who-sell-it/#c8b7ed1711bc [https://perma.cc/NJN9-57LE].
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aspects of these mechanical predictions. First, the underlying data is 
usually gathered from public sources, and therefore, the use of such 
data does not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.18
Thus, law enforcement officers have a significant amount of freedom 
in acquiring this information, which means that they can obtain the 
predictions from big data without needing to meet any legal standard 
such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Essentially, big data 
algorithms can be seen as a force multiplier, allowing police to 
generate more predictive power from the same public information 
that has always been available to them.
The second enticing aspect of big data’s mechanical predictions 
is that they are more accurate than clinical judgments. Studies have 
shown that big data’s mechanical predictions are, on average, 10% 
more accurate than clinical predictions.19 Police officers and judges 
who have adopted these methods have been seeing increased 
accuracy in many different contexts, ranging from predicting where 
crime is likely to occur to determining which defendants are most 
likely to succeed if released on parole.20 The increased accuracy 
offered by big data will lead to both greater efficiency and fairness. 
The system will be more efficient because police and courts will be 
able to focus their resources more effectively. It will be fairer 
because innocent people will be less likely to be stopped, frisked, 
searched, or arrested if big data can successfully narrow the field of 
legitimate suspects.
Big data’s predictive algorithms could be used in a number of 
different ways in the criminal justice system. First, law enforcement 
officers could use these tools to determine where crime is likely to 
occur and to allocate their resources accordingly; as we will see in 
Section I.A, police are already using big data tools for this purpose, 
18. Recently, there have been signs that the Fourth Amendment may be 
expanded so that the gathering or processing of massive amounts of public data may 
be considered a search. Although government surveillance of public places, or of 
publicly available sources, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g.,
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983), the Supreme Court has hinted 
at the possibility that gathering and processing large amounts of information from 
public sources to learn information about a suspect could implicate the Fourth 
Amendment through the “mosaic” theory, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
954-55 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), but that doctrine has not yet gained 
widespread acceptance in courts. For an overview and a critique of the mosaic 
theory, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311 (2012).
19. Grove et al., supra note 13, at 19.
20. See infra notes 22-27, 69-71 and accompanying text.
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with notable success. Second, the results from these predictive 
algorithms could informally influence police officers when they 
make their clinical judgments about whether reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause exists; as I argue in Section I.B, this is probably 
already occurring. Third, police could formally cite the results from 
predictive algorithms in court when justifying their stops or searches 
or when applying for a search warrant. As we see in Section I.C, 
there is as yet no evidence that law enforcement has done this, 
although this is likely to happen soon. Finally, the results from big 
data’s predictive algorithms could be outcome determinative, 
meaning that a police officer or a judge would only consider the 
algorithm’s output and ignore all other evidence. We are a long way 
from this point in the context of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, but Section I.D notes that some courts are coming close to 
allowing mechanical predictions to be outcome determinative for 
bail, sentencing, and parole decisions.21
A. Predictive Algorithms and Policing
Police have a long history of using massive amounts of data to 
help decide where to deploy resources.22 In the 1990s, law
enforcement use of data compilation gained national attention with 
the New York Police Department’s COMPSTAT program.23 Crime 
mapping algorithms quickly spread to other cities and became a 
staple of big-city policing.24 Today, more advanced software has 
21. There is likely to be enormous resistance to adopting a system that is 
outcome determinative in any of these contexts, though I will argue that such an 
option is preferable in certain contexts. See infra Section III.B.
22. For an excellent overview of the use of predictive algorithms by police 
officers, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
23. See Sewell Chan, Why Did Crime Fall in New York City?, N.Y. TIMES 
CITY ROOM (Aug. 13, 2007, 2:10 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/ 
13/why-did-crime-fall-in-new-york-city/?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/2HS9-E27E].
24. In addition to New York, sophisticated crime-mapping software has 
been used in Los Angeles, St. Louis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.,
Oakland, and many other cities. See Stuart Wolpert, Predictive Policing 
Substantially Reduces Crime in Los Angeles During Months-Long Test, UCLA
NEWSROOM (Oct. 7, 2015), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/predictive-policing-
substantially-reduces-crime-in-los-angeles-during-months-long-test [https://perma.cc/ 
3PTX-JXK6]; Maurice Chammah, Policing the Future, VERGE (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/10895804/st-louis-police-hunchlab-predictive-
policing-marshall-project [https://perma.cc/X7UZ-Y4XP]; Darwin Bond-Graham & 
Ali Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes: The Future of Policing Looks a Lot Like 
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made crime-predicting software available in smaller jurisdictions, 
and the National Institute of Justice is funding research into the 
efficacy of such programs.25
These crime prediction software systems vary considerably in 
their sophistication. One program known as PredPol (short for 
“predictive policing”) only looks at past reports of criminal activity 
and then highlights areas of the precinct in which crime has been 
most prevalent during specific time periods.26 The police department 
then assigns more officers to the high-crime areas in order to detect 
or deter crime more effectively. Police officers using the software in 
a suburb of Los Angeles saw their crime rate decrease by 13% over 
the course of four months, while it rose by 0.4% in surrounding 
areas.27 A more sophisticated program called HunchLab also uses 
reports of past criminal activity, but adds in additional factors.28
Some of these extra factors, such as the proximity to subway stations 
or bars, or the current weather conditions, have an obvious 
correlation to particular types of criminal activity. Other factors seem 
unrelated, such as the decrease in aggravated assaults on windy days, 
or the increase in car thefts near schools.29
The Fresno Police Department uses crime prediction software 
in a somewhat different way, employing a software system called 
Beware to warn police officers of the threat level for the location of a 
Good Branding, SF WEEKLY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/ 
all-tomorrows-crimes-the-future-of-policing-looks-a-lot-like-good-branding/Content? 
oid=2827968 [https://perma.cc/2ARE-MFS2]; Eugene K. Chow, Is Predictive Policing 
Making Minority Report a Reality?, WEEK (Oct. 7, 2013), http://theweek.com/ 
articles/459396/predictive-policing-making-minority-report-reality [https://perma.cc/ 
3X7W-R3VG]; Darwin Bond-Graham, Oakland Mayor Schaaf and Police Seek 
Unproven ‘Predictive Policing’ Software, E. BAY EXPRESS (June 24, 2015), http:// 
www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/oakland-mayor-schaaf-and-police-seek-unproven-
predictive-policing-software/Content?oid=4362343 [https://perma.cc/99HG-MYPA].
25. See Chammah, supra note 24.
26. Id.; see Cameron Albert-Deitch, Predictive Policing Crime Prevention 
Software Successful for APD, ATLANTA MAGAZINE (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www. 
atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/predictive-policing-crime-prevention-software-
successful-for-apd/ [https://perma.cc/F8YY-2JRE]. PredPol is now being used by more 
than fifty different police agencies in the United States and Britain. See Chammah, 
supra note 24.
27. See Chammah, supra note 24. Other jurisdictions have seen similar 
improvements in crime rates: Norcross, Georgia, saw a 20% decrease in crime after 
adopting PredPol, which led the Atlanta police department to adopt it as well. See
Albert-Deitch, supra note 26.
28. See Chammah, supra note 24.
29. Id.
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911 call.30 As law enforcement officers are on their way to the 
location, workers in police headquarters plug the address into the
Beware program, which quickly analyzes countless pieces of data, 
including “arrest reports, . . . commercial databases, deep Web 
searches and . . . social media postings” that are associated with that 
address.31 The program then offers a rating for the location: green for 
safe, yellow for caution, and red for dangerous.32 Police officers who 
arrive at the scene can take appropriate precautions based on that 
rating. 
Chicago takes this process one step further, using predictive 
software to determine which individuals are most likely to be 
involved in a crime.33 Using a special algorithm designed by an 
engineer at the Illinois Institute of Technology, the Chicago Police 
Department created a “heat list” of 400 people who are “most likely 
to be involved in a shooting or homicide.”34 Police will then deploy 
resources to monitor these individuals more closely than other 
individuals35 in an attempt to deter their criminal behavior by letting 
them know they are under increased surveillance or to swiftly 
apprehend them if they do commit crimes.36
30. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating 
Your Threat ‘Score’, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-
score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
B5HT-PNT9].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer 
Predicts Crimes, But Is It Racist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www. 
theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-
but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/J6VQ-Q64E].
34. Id.; see also Robert L. Mitchell, Predictive Policing Gets Personal,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/ 
2486424/government-it/predictive-policing-gets- personal.html [https://perma.cc/6SR9-
4QGW] (describing a similar program in North Carolina).
35. Stroud, supra note 33.
36. Id. Kansas City has been using a similar program, known as KC NoVA, 
which targets individuals “at risk” of committing violent crimes. The program warns 
these individuals that they are being watched and that “harsh penalties will be 
imposed for even petty slights once warnings have been given,” but it also provides 
services such as housing and social services to help the individuals stay out of 
trouble. See John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint 
Those Most Likely to Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-
commit-crimes.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7UYW-KFDM].
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Using predictive software to determine how to allocate scarce 
law enforcement resources is not limited to investigations of street 
crime. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a secret algorithm to 
determine which of the over one hundred million tax returns should 
be audited each year. The IRS algorithm scans through every tax 
return, looking for outlying levels of deductions or other factors that 
indicate a higher chance of fraud, and then it assigns a risk level to 
each return.37 Those returns with high risk factors are then personally 
reviewed by IRS agents to see if an audit is appropriate.38
Some critics of adapting big data to our criminal justice system 
argue that it does not, in fact, make more accurate decisions. 
Professor Bernard Harcourt has argued that predictive policing may 
actually reduce the efficiency of stops and searches, because when 
police focus their resources on certain portions of the population, 
they necessarily withdraw resources from other portions of the 
population.39 According to his model, crime will decrease among 
those who are targeted, but it will increase among those who are not 
targeted; thus, whether the overall crime rate decreases actually 
depends on the comparative elasticity of the crime rate in each of the 
two groups.40 This critique is persuasive if the police are using a very 
basic predictive policing model that focuses on one specific 
neighborhood or (as in Harcourt’s example) one specific race. But 
the critique becomes weaker if the police are using a multi-factor 
algorithm to direct resources, and it becomes weaker still if it is 
merely used to determine whether reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause exist. However, Harcourt’s objection does highlight the need 
to ensure that the data used by the predictive algorithm remains 
current; that is, if there is a feedback effect that makes certain factors 
less likely to indicate criminal activity, the algorithm should be 
adjusted to ensure that those factors are given less weight or 
eliminated entirely. It also highlights a legitimate concern about 
relying on data which itself may be tainted by past discrimination or 
inaccurate decisions, a topic we will address in Section III.A below.
37. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 10.
38. Id.
39. Id. ch. 4.
40. Id. at 123.
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B. Predictive Algorithms as Background Data
PredPol, Hunchlab, Beware, Chicago’s “heat list,” and the IRS 
algorithm represent what we could call the first stage of crime 
prediction algorithms—algorithms used to help police decide where 
and how to deploy their resources, but not used (at least formally) to 
make any specific legal determination.41 But as the amount of data 
about individuals grows and becomes more accessible, police will 
use big data at later stages of the criminal justice system. It is likely 
that police already informally use these tools as background 
information in making their determination as to whether reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause exists.
Assume a police officer observes marginally suspicious 
activity—say, a suspect walking slowly down the street at night, 
peering into windows and constantly looking over his shoulder. If the 
officer is using crime prediction software, and the software informs 
her that she is currently in a low crime neighborhood with few 
burglaries, she may simply assume that the suspect is engaged in 
innocent conduct and merely observe the suspect for a few minutes 
until he leaves the area. But if the software informs her that there are 
many burglaries that occur in this neighborhood at this time of night, 
that extra factor could be enough to change her response and lead her 
to conduct a Terry stop of the suspect. Or consider a police officer 
who uses risk assessment software and shows up at a home in 
response to a 911 call to find two individuals engaged in a heated 
argument, one with a bruise on his cheek. The injured individual 
refuses to tell the police officer whether he has been assaulted. If the 
risk assessment software flashes a peaceful green, the responding 
officer might simply give a warning to the two individuals or ask one 
of them to take a walk to cool down. But if the software presented a 
red light, indicating the presence of a violent individual at the 
location, the officer might decide that she has probable cause to 
arrest the uninjured individual and charge him with assault. 
The same calculus would occur—consciously or 
unconsciously—when an officer is investigating a potential crime 
and a member of a heat list is a suspect, or when an IRS agent is 
reviewing a return that has already been flagged by the software. 
Other police officers have mobile applications that can display the 
41. Another example of law enforcement using big data to try to detect 
criminal activity is the National Security Agency’s massive metadata collection 
program. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 792, 816-17 (2d Cir. 2015).
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location of individuals suspected of gang activity, registered sex 
offenders, or those who have outstanding warrants, thus allowing a 
police officer to quickly generate reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.42 Indeed, presence in a “high crime area” is a factor that is 
frequently cited by police officers who are explaining why they 
believed that reasonable suspicion existed,43 and the fact that a 
suspect is a known violent felon could also be used by an officer in 
deciding whether to make an arrest.44 Many law enforcement agents 
(and many lay people) would say that it would be foolish to ignore 
these signals when deciding on the appropriate course of action. 
Although police probably use these results as background 
information in making their determination, so far no law 
enforcement agent or prosecutor has formally used the results of 
crime prediction software in court as a factor to support reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.45 Instead, courts rely on the testimony of 
the law enforcement officers to establish the necessary factors, even 
in situations where big data could provide more accurate 
information.46
C. Predictive Algorithms as Formal Factors
The increasing pervasiveness of predictive algorithms in
policing means that police officers will soon be using these 
predictions as part of their arguments justifying reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause. Moreover, as police officers use these factors 
42. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 368-69. 
43. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
44. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005).
45. A recent comprehensive report from the RAND Corporation surveyed 
every known use of predictive algorithms in law enforcement and showed no 
evidence of such algorithms being used to determine reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause. See WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., RAND CORP., PREDICTIVE POLICING:
THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 107-08
(2013).
46. For example, in the Wardlow case, the Court merely accepted the 
testimony of the officer that the stop occurred in an “area known for heavy narcotics 
trafficking.” 528 U.S. at 119-23. In fact, the actual crime data from the Chicago 
district where the stop occurred showed that the district ranked just at the median for 
criminal activity of the twenty-five districts in the city. See Amici Curiae Brief of 
the National Ass’n of Police Organizations et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7, 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (No. 98-1036), 1999 WL 451226, at *7. For an excellent 
discussion of how crime mapping has been used (or ignored) by the Supreme Court, 
see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: 
Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2011). 
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more often, judges will begin to expect this kind of hard data and 
may begin to reject the current subjective, experiential, or anecdotal 
evidence that officers currently rely upon.47 This will almost 
certainly result in more accurate determinations overall. To see why, 
we need to take a closer look at the current system that is used to 
determine reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
For example, consider the “high-crime area” determination that 
is frequently cited by police officers as a factor supporting 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The opinion of a police 
officer about how much crime occurs in a certain area is likely to be 
based on a small sample of cases; it may be based on an outdated 
reputation of a neighborhood; and it is possibly tainted by many 
different kinds of bias.48 Even if accurate, it is inappropriately 
comparative. If the neighborhood in question has three times the 
number of drug arrests per week than all of the surrounding 
neighborhoods, that fact in itself is irrelevant to a reasonable 
suspicion argument.49 Instead, the police officer and the judge should 
consider the absolute number of criminal activity—does the 
neighborhood in question have two drug arrests per week, or ten 
drug arrests per week, or fifty drug arrests per week?50
Take another example: An officer is only allowed to frisk a 
suspect during a Terry stop if the officer has a reason to believe the 
suspect is armed. Up until now, that “reason to believe”—like the 
reasonable suspicion underlying the stop itself—has been based on 
the opinion and past experience of the police officer and evaluated 
based on the intuition of the reviewing court. Police officers 
47. Ferguson, supra note 46, at 221-22 (“If the officer did not base his
decision on specific data about a specific crime problem in a specific area, or if the 
data relied upon did not demonstrate a specific and relevant crime problem, then 
reliance on this information should not be considered.”).
48. Id. at 224-25. Professor Ferguson notes that using actual data about 
high-crime areas will probably be an improvement: “While not perfect, a more data-
driven approach is an improvement over the police ‘war stories’ that have essentially 
served as the basis of prior designations of high-crime areas. In fact, analysis of 
crime data has shown that subjective opinions about high-crime areas are often 
erroneous.” For a discussion of the possible inherent biases in the data, see infra
Subsection II.A.2.
49. Ferguson, supra note 46, at 223.
50. In fact, the best numbers to consider would not be based on arrest, but 
rather on actual criminal activity. Using arrest numbers as a proxy for criminal 
activity may lead to a number of inaccuracies, which I discuss in Section III.B, infra.
For a good discussion on the difficulty of determining whether a neighborhood is a 
“high-crime area” in the absence of any evidence from big data, see United States v. 
Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2007).
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routinely testify, for example, that individuals suspected of engaging 
in narcotics transactions are more likely to have weapons on their 
person. In practice, judges have credited this testimony, regularly 
approving Terry frisks when the police officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe a suspect was engaged in narcotics trafficking.51
But what is the actual link between selling narcotics and weapons 
possession? If the former actually does make the latter more likely, 
what is the degree of increase in probability? Is it the same for every 
city, and every neighborhood of every city, and every type of 
narcotic? Clinical judgments can answer none of these questions—
nor can they answer these questions for any other factor relied upon 
by police when justifying a Terry frisk. Thus, the “reason to believe” 
standard has become a legal term of art, defined not by actual 
probability but by years of precedents in which certain fact patterns
have been approved by courts based solely on the experience and 
expertise of police officers. 
In fact, the Bureau of Justice review of over 200,000 criminals 
who were convicted in state court shows that only 8.6% of those who 
were convicted of drug dealing carried a firearm at the time of the 
offense, and only 7.8% of those convicted of drug possession carried 
a firearm at the time of the offense.52 Does an 8.6% chance give 
officers a “reason to believe?” Judges have never answered this 
question, preferring instead to rely on the self-reported intuition and 
experience of the very police officers who are trying to justify their 
own actions.
Other used factors for clinical judgments also may comport 
with the intuition of police officers (and with the intuition of the 
judges who review the police officers’ actions), but may be 
empirically false. For example, flight from police has long been held 
to be a significant factor in determining reasonable suspicion,53 but 
studies have shown that in “high-crime urban communities where the 
51. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122 (“[Officer Nolan] immediately 
conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was 
common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions.”).
52. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM 
USE BY OFFENDERS 3 (2001). The report also found that 2.9% of those who 
committed sexual assault carried a firearm, while 4% of those who committed
burglary carried a firearm. Id. Of course, the Terry standard asks courts to consider 
the likelihood that the suspect has a weapon, not merely a firearm, but this only 
emphasizes the need to apply more accurate statistics to the analysis.
53. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125; United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 720 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (suspect was stopped in an area “known for the sales of cocaine and 
marijuana” and he fled upon seeing the officers exit their cars). 
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population is disproportionately minority,” there is a very weak link 
between flight from police and criminal activity.54
Courts have long been criticized for deferring to the various 
factors police officers use in determining that they have the authority 
to make a Terry stop. In his dissent in United States v. Sokolow,
Justice Thurgood Marshall listed dozens of cases in which different 
circuit courts had approved of contradictory factors offered to show 
that a suspect fit a “drug courier profile” at an airport: first to 
deplane; last to deplane, deplaned in the middle, one way ticket, 
round-trip ticket, nonstop flight, changed planes, gym bag, new 
suitcase, traveled alone, traveled with companion, acted nervously, 
acted too calmly.55 As one pair of commentators noted, “Apparently 
almost any human trait can be a basis for suspicion, and nearly 
everybody exhibits several potentially suspicious . . . factors at any 
given time.”56
In the recent case of Floyd v. City of New York,57 a class action
suit challenging the stop-and-frisk policies of the New York Police 
Department, the trial judge criticized the often used police factors 
such as “furtive movements,” “high crime area,” and “suspicious 
bulge” as overly vague.58 During testimony in the case, two police 
54. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 792 (2000).
55. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Illegal immigration profiles came under a similar attack in a dissent in 
United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., 
dissenting).
56. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling 
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 740 (2002); see also
Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: “All Seems Infected That Th’ Infected 
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic’d Eye”, 65 N.C. L. REV. 417 (1987); United 
States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Whether you stand still or 
move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police 
as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, 
promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited.”); Utah v. 
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[An officer’s] 
justification must provide specific reasons why the officer suspected you were
breaking the law, but it may factor in your ethnicity, where you live, what you were 
wearing, and how you behaved. The officer does not even need to know which law 
you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction—even 
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.” (citations omitted)).
57. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
58. Id. at 559-60. In the data from New York City reviewed by the court, 
“furtive movements” was cited as a factor 42% of the time; “high crime area” 55% 
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officers testified as to what they understood “furtive movements” to 
mean:
One [officer] explained that “furtive movement is a very broad concept,” 
and could include a person “changing direction,” “walking in a certain 
way,” “[a]cting a little suspicious,” “making a movement that is not 
regular,” being “very fidgety,” “going in and out of his pocket,” “going in 
and out of a location,” “looking back and forth constantly,” “looking over 
their shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their belt,” “moving in and out of a 
car too quickly,” “[t]urning a part of their body away from you,” 
“[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,” “getting a 
little nervous, maybe shaking,” and “stutter[ing].” Another officer 
explained that “usually” a furtive movement is someone “hanging out in 
front of [a] building, sitting on the benches or something like that” and 
then making a “quick movement,” such as “bending down and quickly 
standing back up,” “going inside the lobby . . . and then quickly coming 
back out,” or “all of a sudden becom[ing] very nervous, very aware.”59
In the statistics from the Floyd case, police officers cited “furtive 
movements” as a factor in 42% of their stops.60
Not only are many of the clinical judgment factors overly 
vague, their supposed link to criminal activity is based on a very 
limited data set. Factors offered by law enforcement officers are 
frequently supported only by the officer’s own prior experience, and 
in approving (or disapproving)61 of these factors as probative of 
criminal activity, courts either cite the expertise of the officers or use 
their own intuition to evaluate the probability that a crime will occur. 
Unsurprisingly, the result of these vague standards and limited 
data sets is a troublingly low hit rate for police officers conducting 
stop and frisks. The recent expansion of Terry stops in New York 
of the time, and “suspicious bulge” 10% of the time. Id. at 559. Sometimes the only 
factors cited by the officer were two of these three factors. Id.
59. Id. at 561. The officers in New York are hardly unique in their use of 
vague factors. In Philadelphia, police were engaging in overly aggressive Terry
stops using factors such as “loitering” or “acting suspiciously”; after the police were 
sued over their tactics, they agreed in a consent decree to stop using these factors. 
See Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 2-4, 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 10-5952).
60. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
61. In the Sokolow case itself, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no 
reasonable suspicion because the factors used by the agents were “vague and 
inchoate,” “hazy in form, susceptible to great adaptations, and almost entirely 
speculative,” and that “[t]he obvious lack of substantiation [of the government’s 
conclusion] betrays its lack of merit.” United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 
1423-24 (9th Cir. 1987). But seven Supreme Court Justices looked at the same 
factors and concluded that probable cause did exist. United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
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City resulted in a regime in which only 12% of all Terry stops in 
New York City resulted in an arrest or a summons.62 During that 
same period, only 1.5% of the Terry frisks produced evidence of a 
weapon.63 Thus, for that time period, the police officers’ standard for 
reasonable suspicion was in fact a 12% likelihood that criminal 
activity was occurring, while their standard for a “reason to believe” 
that a suspect was armed (thus justifying a frisk) was 1.5%. Although 
courts have been unwilling to explicitly quantify the percentage 
chance for “reasonable suspicion,” it is probably more than 12% and 
certainly more than 1.5%.64
Indeed, the district court in the Floyd case concluded that many 
of the stops by the police officers during this time period were not 
supported by reasonable suspicion.65 This implies that the 12% 
success rate over that time period was insufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion, since it was the result of overly aggressive 
police tactics and the use of improper factors. Similarly, a review of 
police tactics in Philadelphia concluded that only 3% of the stops 
resulted in recovery of contraband; the review also concluded that 
reasonable suspicion was lacking for somewhere between 35% and 
50% of these stops.66
Thus, there is a growing dissonance between the objective, 
data-driven tools used by police officers to guide their conduct, and 
the intuitive arguments and subjective experience used by police 
officers to justify that conduct in court. Given the success of the 
data-driven tools in everyday police work, it seems inevitable that 
they will soon be formally used by police officers in assessing 
whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists. 
Although these predictive algorithms have not yet been used in 
the context of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, they are not 
62. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 241-250 and accompanying text for some estimates of 
where courts might set this number if predictive algorithms force them to do so.
65. For example, in 36% of the cases the police did not identify any 
suspected crimes and approximately half the forms used “Furtive Movements” and 
“High Crime Area” as factors, which the judge determined were “vague and 
subjective terms” that cannot on their own “reliably demonstrate individualized 
reasonable suspicion.” Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559-60.
66. See Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report, supra note 59, at 3-4. The police conceded 
that the rate of stops without documented reasonable suspicion was around 35%, but 
argued that this high number was due to “incomplete paperwork, improper 
narratives used by police officers, and an overall lack of credibility in the electronic 
data base.” Id. at 4.
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completely foreign to the criminal justice system. As we will see in 
the next Section, courts have been using these predictive algorithms 
in other contexts, such as bail hearings and parole hearings.
D. Predictive Algorithms Elsewhere in the Criminal Justice System
The final step in the use of predictive algorithms is for the 
police officers and judges to make their decisions based solely on the 
outputs of the algorithms without exercising any of their own 
independent judgment. We may never get to this stage for reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause determinations (and we may not want 
to, as discussed below),67 but we have come close to such a world in 
other contexts, such as bail determinations, sentencing decisions, and 
parole judgments. For decades, judges used generalizations based on 
risk factors in making these decisions, but in recent years, just as in 
the policing context, big data has slowly been infiltrating these 
procedures, using vast quantities of data to empirically test 
traditional factors and experiment with new factors.68
One example of this shift in the bail context is the Public Safety 
Assessment (PSA) designed by the Arnold Foundation, which has 
been adopted by about two dozen jurisdictions over the past few 
years.69 The PSA, which is based on an analysis of one and a half 
million criminal cases, uses up to ten different objective factors to 
determine whether a defendant is a flight risk or likely to commit a 
crime during pretrial release.70 The results of the PSA have been 
nearly uniformly positive—after pilot projects, the city of Charlotte 
lowered its pretrial detention by 20%, with no increase in crime or 
67. See infra notes 265-282 and accompanying text.
68. In particular, the empirical scholarship on this issue has grown to focus 
on big data techniques such as machine learning or massive statistical analyses. See,
e.g., Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting Domestic 
Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94 (2016); Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine 
Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP.
222 (2015); Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting 
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 513
(2013).
69. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-
granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P8NE-LDUL].
70. Id.
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bench warrants, while the state of Kentucky has saved significant 
money and increased accuracy of its pretrial decisions.71
The sentencing process is also undergoing a quiet revolution in 
the methods that judges use to assess risk of reoffending. Some states 
now use formal “risk assessment instruments” to determine the 
appropriate sentence after conviction.72 These risk assessment 
instruments are designed using an algorithm that takes into account 
decades of prior cases.73 They typically use around ten different 
inputs, such as age and history of alcohol abuse, and then assign 
defendants a number on a scale, which translates to a percentage 
chance that the defendant will reoffend within a certain period of 
time.74 For example, Virginia developed a nine-factor risk 
assessment instrument based on past evidence and uses the 
instrument to help determine whether to divert a defendant away 
from a prison sentence.75 As of now, judges use these risk assessment 
instruments as tools to help them make their decision, and judges 
still maintain the discretion to depart from the recommendations 
made by the instrument,76 but the influence of these instruments on 
the actual sentencing decision is growing.
Predictive algorithms have also gained popularity in assessing 
the appropriateness of parole. Mechanical predictions were used as 
far back as the 1920s, long before computers and large databases 
became available.77 The goal of these early predictions was to assess 
an inmate’s risk of recidivism. Due to the vast number of individuals 
who were paroled, even in the early years there was a large pool of 
subjects for a natural experiment. Sociologists and psychologists 
utilized this pool to examine the characteristics of those who did and 
did not succeed on parole.78 By 2004, over 70% of states that 
maintained an active parole system employed some form of 
mechanical predictive instrument in determining whether parole was 
71. Id.
72. Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 196, 203-05 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 
2012).
73. Id. at 200.
74. Id. at 204.
75. Id. The risk assessment tool looks at type of offense, gender, age, 
employment status, and four aspects of the defendant’s criminal record. Id.
76. Id. For example, in Virginia, 59% of defendants who were considered to 
be a low risk by the algorithm were still sentenced to a prison term by the judge. Id.
77. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 48-51.
78. Id. at 48.
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appropriate.79 One common tool, the Level of Services Inventory-
Revised (LSI-R), takes into account fifty-four separate factors 
ranging from criminal history and education level to alcohol abuse 
and attitude towards sentencing.80 Courts, correctional facilities, and 
parole boards routinely use these instruments in determining what 
level of supervision an inmate needs in prison, whether he should be 
paroled, and what conditions are necessary if parole is granted.81
Like police officers, judges who make clinical judgments about 
bail, sentencing, or parole may subconsciously or explicitly use 
stereotypes or intuitions that are incorrect.82 In creating the PSA, the 
Arnold Foundation determined that many traditional factors used in 
bail hearings, such as defendant’s employment status, community 
ties, or drug and alcohol abuse, were poor predictors of flight risk.83
They also concluded that a face-to-face interview—traditionally a 
staple of prearraignment assessment—was not a useful tool.84 In the 
sentencing context, many judges had long believed that mental 
illness was a strong indicator of recidivism; actual studies of 
mentally ill criminals have shown that not to be the case.85
There are two obvious differences between the predictive 
algorithms used by police during their investigations and those used 
by courts in making decisions about bail, sentencing, or parole. The 
first seems significant but in fact is relatively trivial: The police 
officers are making predictions about past or current behavior (i.e., 
whether the person they are about to stop is currently engaged in 
criminal activity or whether the house they would like to search 
currently contains drugs), while courts are making predictions about 
future behavior (i.e., whether the defendant will return to court if 
released or whether the defendant will commit more crimes if 
released on parole). In truth, however, there is no material difference 
between these two types of predictions—both involve a decision-
maker in the criminal justice system trying to use known facts to 
79. Id. at 78.
80. Id. at 80-81.
81. Id. at 82.
82. Id. at 20-21. 
83. Id.; see Dewan, supra note 69.
84. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 82; see Dewan, supra note 69.
85. Henry J. Steadman, Implications from the Baxstrom Experience, 1 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 189, 190, 193 (1973). Studies of nearly 1,000 inmates at 
a mental hospital for the criminally insane showed that over 97% of the inmate–
patients did not return after being released; even among those with the highest risk 
factors (violent criminal history, juvenile record, numerous prior conviction), less 
than 10% returned. Id.
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determine the odds that an unknown fact is true. As noted by 
Professor Barbara Underwood in one of the first articles regarding 
prediction and the law, “Some past or present facts are as elusive as 
any prediction, and some predictions can be made with as much 
confidence as most determinations of past fact.”86
The second, more significant distinction is in the amount of 
time available to conduct the prediction. Police officers deciding 
whether to stop or arrest an individual on the street are reacting to an 
ongoing and sometimes rapidly changing situation, and therefore 
may not have the time to do anything but rely on their clinical 
judgments. Even if an accurate, fast-processing algorithm is 
available to the police, they may not have time to make the necessary 
observations that are required for the algorithm to deliver an accurate 
prediction. Judges who are reviewing these judgments at a later 
suppression hearing, as well as judges who are making decisions 
about search warrants, bail, sentencing, or parole, have the time to 
gather more data about the defendant and his circumstances, and then 
make use of a predictive algorithm in making their decision. In other 
words, predictive software may be less accurate when used by law 
enforcement officers than when used by judges. 
Nevertheless, the success of these mechanical predictions in the 
context of bail and parole hearings shows that courts may be 
receptive to applying these tools on the front end of the criminal 
justice system—to justify stops, arrests, and searches. Data-driven 
predictive algorithms represent an opportunity to dramatically 
increase the accuracy of these decisions, thus ensuring that fewer 
innocent citizens are detained or searched, and increasing the 
efficiency of our law enforcement resources.87 However, a number of 
obstacles remain—both in the design of the algorithms and in the 
legal standards used by courts. We will discuss these obstacles in the 
next Part.
86. Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior 
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1413 
(1979). Professor Underwood gives an example that “past states of mind are 
notoriously difficult to determine, and it is relatively easy to determine the amount 
of interest that will be paid by a bank on a deposit.” Id. at 1413 n.10.
87. Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 33-38), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2760388 [https://perma.cc/NV47-URGD]; see also infra note 140-141
and accompanying text. 
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II. CHALLENGES TO USING PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS 
As noted in Part I, crime prediction software could soon be 
used by police officers on the street and by judges in criminal courts 
to prove reasonable suspicion or probable cause. This development 
could potentially result in more accurate and consistent 
determinations of whether these standards have indeed been met—
but only if certain obstacles can be overcome. First, there is a 
concern that predictive algorithms would use factors that are illegal 
for courts to consider, such as the race of the subject.88 Similarly, the 
underlying data that the algorithms use may be in itself biased; thus, 
using these algorithms would not actually increase accuracy but 
merely reinforce decades of discriminatory policing. Also, the law 
requires police officers and judges to act on facts that are specific to 
the case at hand; the general probability factors used by big data may 
not be able to provide this specificity. And finally, the hyper-
quantified world of big data is currently an uncomfortable fit with 
the flexible standards used by courts. 
All of these obstacles are surmountable, but only if the 
algorithms and databases used by the big data analyses are made 
more transparent so that courts can evaluate the underlying processes 
and the standards being used, and only if courts are willing to accept 
the quantified world of predictive software.
A. Detecting the Racial Biases in the Predictive Algorithms
To the extent that human beings have a hand in creating the 
algorithms and compiling the data that the algorithms use, human 
biases will infect the results. Although it is impossible to eliminate 
these biases altogether, there are ways to minimize the problems they 
create.
88. Some scholars argue that many of the risk prediction factors currently in 
use in sentencing decisions may be unconstitutional because they rely directly or 
indirectly on race or other suspect classes. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803, 819 (2014). But see Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management in Juvenile Justice, 27 CRIM. JUST. 10, 13-15 (2013) (use of gender and 
age in sentencing decisions is permissible because it survives intermediate scrutiny); 
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1385-88 (2001) (sentencing factors 
survive a strict scrutiny analysis).
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1. Direct and Indirect Use of Forbidden Factors
Mechanical predictions are not necessarily color-blind. If an 
individual’s race is a significant factor in determining whether a 
certain outcome is likely to occur, then the individuals who are 
designing (and using) the algorithm may be tempted to use race as 
one of the inputs in order to achieve more accurate results. In some 
cases outside the context of criminal procedure, this may be 
relatively harmless—for example, when companies use big data to 
decide where to market certain products or when political campaigns 
use big data to decide which voters to contact with a certain kind of 
outreach. In other cases, race-based factors can be quite harmful (and 
illegal)—for example, in deciding which customers are a good credit 
risk for a home loan89 or which job applicants should be hired.90 In 
the context of criminal procedure, race-based factors are especially 
problematic, both legally and morally. 
For the purposes of this discussion, let’s assume that a private 
company has developed an algorithm that can predict with great 
accuracy whether drugs will be found inside a certain house. The 
algorithm requires the user to enter six different inputs, such as the 
neighborhood where the house is located, the prior criminal 
convictions of the house’s owner, and observations made by police 
officers about activity outside the house. One of these inputs is the 
race of the owner of the home. Assume, further, that without using 
the race factor, the algorithm can predict the presence of drugs with 
40% accuracy, but with the race factor, the algorithm can predict the 
presence of drugs with 55% accuracy. Assume the police have 
purchased this algorithm and are using it in their warrant application. 
Should they input the race factor in order to enhance the algorithm’s 
accuracy? In other words, would it be illegal for the state to use race 
as a factor in determining probable cause or reasonable suspicion if it 
could be definitively proven that using race made the prediction 
more accurate?
89. See, e.g., Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial 
Injustice. Here’s How, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/13/your-credit-score-is-racist-heres-why 
[https://perma.cc/4P6B-WM55]; 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
90. See Lee Price, Racial Discrimination Continues to Play a Part in Hiring 
Decisions, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.epi.org/publication/ 
webfeatures_snapshots_archive_09172003/ [https://perma.cc/465W-KRGM]; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (2012).
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Surprisingly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has little to say 
about whether race can be used as a factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. Courts are unanimous in holding that 
race alone can never be the basis for a stop or a search, for the 
obvious reason that a person’s race alone can never create probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
occurring.91 However, some courts have approved cases in which 
race was one of many factors in deciding whether reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause existed—for example, when searching 
for illegal immigrants near the Mexican border.92 Other courts have 
disagreed, arguing that a person’s race is “of such little probative 
value [in the reasonable suspicion analysis] that it may not be 
considered as a relevant factor.”93
As these cases make clear, the only problem with using race 
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that in the vast majority 
of cases, the race of a subject is not a relevant indicator as to whether 
the suspect is more or less likely to engage in criminal activity.94
Therefore, any law enforcement official who does consider race is 
almost certainly doing so because of an irrational bias against that 
particular race. But this objection is not entirely valid in every 
circumstance—as noted above, if the law enforcement officer is 
looking for illegal immigrants near the Mexican border, for example, 
the suspect’s race could conceivably be one factor in trying to predict 
whether the suspect was illegally in the country. Likewise, if a 
person seems “out of place” due to her race (for example, a white 
person in a predominantly black neighborhood), her race could be 
one factor that would lead to reasonable suspicion that she was 
engaging in criminal activity.95
91. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) 
(“[Mexican ancestry] alone . . . does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to 
ask if they are aliens.”).
92. Id. (“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an 
alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . .”); see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976).
93. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 
2000).
94. See, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1986) (“No rational inference may be drawn from the race of [a person] that he may 
be engaged in criminal activities.”). 
95. It is harder to come up with an example in the bail context where the 
defendant’s race was actually a relevant factor in determining flight risk or danger to 
the community. Certain factors that are correlated to race (such as income level or 
employment status) may be relevant, however. 
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Given this jurisprudence, there is no valid Fourth Amendment 
objection to using race as a factor in a mechanical prediction 
algorithm for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Assuming we 
have a properly designed algorithm,96 race would only be used as a 
factor if it actually was a useful predictor of individualized 
suspicion; in other words, there would be empirical statistical proof 
that in the given context race did help determine whether or not an 
individual was guilty of a crime.97 In our hypothetical case, in which 
the use of race increased the accuracy of the prediction from 40% to 
55%, using the race-based factor would not be prohibited under the 
Fourth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause is another matter, however. Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, race can only be used as a factor in state 
actions if the use of race is necessary and if it is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling state interest.98 This is a difficult, if not 
impossible, burden for law enforcement to meet in the stop-and-
search context. Some courts have held that the use of race as a factor 
does not require exclusion as long as there were sufficient other 
factors to justify the stop or search,99 while others have noted that 
law enforcement officers violate the Equal Protection Clause if they 
incorporate race routinely as a factor in their drug courier profile.100
Neither of these principles bodes well for using race as a factor in 
mechanical prediction algorithms, regardless of how accurate it 
might be. As further evidence that racial factors are forbidden by the 
Equal Protection Clause, nearly all the civil suits alleging racial 
96. As we will see, one of the objections to using mechanical predictions is 
that the underlying data may be tainted by preexisting biases in the criminal justice 
system that overstate the criminal activity of certain ethnic minorities. See infra
Subsection II.A.2.
97. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he 
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws 
is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). But see Gross & 
Barnes, supra note 56, at 733-38 (surveying lower court decisions and concluding 
that “American judges are ambivalent and divided about the use of race as a basis 
for individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Lower court cases go 
both ways, but increasingly the tone is negative”).
98. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct. App. 
1990).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(en banc); see also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 333 (1998) (discussing the legality of racial profiling).
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profiling result in consent decrees that forbid the use of race as a 
factor.101
Outside the Fourth Amendment context, the seminal case on 
racial bias in the criminal justice system is McCleskey v. Kemp, in 
which a black defendant argued that the state of Georgia engaged in 
racial discrimination when administering the death penalty.102 The 
defendant relied on a study that showed that defendants who killed 
white victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than 
those who killed black victims.103 The study also showed that black 
defendants were more likely to get the death penalty than white 
defendants.104 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 
arguments, holding that in order to prevail on an equal protection 
claim, the defendant had to demonstrate that the decision-makers in 
the process acted with a “discriminatory purpose.”105 The Justices 
were concerned with interfering with the discretion that is given to 
prosecutors, judges, and juries, and thus said it required 
“exceptionally clear proof before [the Court] would infer that the 
discretion has been abused.”106
Based on this jurisprudence, it is hard to see our hypothetical 
algorithm passing constitutional muster. Even assuming that the 
interdiction of drugs is a compelling state interest, law enforcement 
would be hard pressed to argue that using the race-based factor was 
necessary and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose. The use 
of the algorithm would probably be seen as nothing more than a 
sophisticated method of racial profiling—an institutionalization of 
using race as a factor in determining probable cause. 
The only plausible defense for the state would be to argue that 
although race is clearly a factor in the decision made by the 
algorithm, the decision is not made with a “discriminatory purpose” 
as forbidden by McCleskey. In other words, those who design and 
use the algorithm are (arguably) not acting with racial animus or out 
of any intent to treat the members of one race differently than 
another. This narrower definition of “discriminatory purpose” is 
consistent with McCleskey’s language, which held that 
101. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 56, at 743 (citing settlement 
agreements with the Maryland State Police and various other Department of Justice 
racial profiling consent decrees).
102. 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987).
103. Id. at 293-99 & n.11.
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 292-93.
106. Id. at 297.
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“‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition 
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action 
at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”107 This does not really fit the 
state’s motivation in using the algorithm—the police are not 
choosing to use the algorithm (or, more specifically, the race factor) 
“because of” its adverse effects on a particular race; they are using it 
to increase the accuracy of their predictions. 
However, the narrow definition of “discriminatory purpose” is 
not borne out in other areas of criminal procedure. For example, in 
the context of jury selection, the Court held that if a defendant 
established a pattern of racial discrimination in peremptory jury 
challenges, the prosecutor could only prevail if she could provide a 
racially neutral reason for making those challenges.108 The Court 
further noted that “the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s 
prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he 
challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption—or his 
intuitive judgment—that they would be partial to the defendant 
because of their shared race.”109 This would be analogous to a 
prosecutor arguing that explicit discrimination should be allowed in 
the probable cause algorithm because it increases the accuracy of the 
prediction.
Thus, our hypothetical algorithm could not legally use race as a 
factor, however much that factor could be proven to increase 
accuracy. This legal conclusion is consistent with most individuals’ 
intuitive moral sense and (relatedly) to the political feasibility of 
using predictive algorithms. In the past, the media has harshly 
criticized racial profiling,110 and it is unlikely that the public would 
support a system that regularly and explicitly used race as a 
significant factor to determine whether to stop a person or search his 
home.
But explicit use of race is not the only potential problem in the 
context of predictive algorithms, and this is where the need for 
107. Id. at 298 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979)).
108. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). 
109. Id. at 97.
110. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Officers Who See Racial Bias 
in the NYPD, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2015/01/the-nypd-officers-who-see-racial-bias-in-the-nypd/384106/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3VS2-2X6F].
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transparency becomes significant. It would be relatively easy for 
courts to enforce a rule that prohibits the police from using the 
defendant’s race directly as a factor in predictive algorithms, but this 
may not prevent the algorithm from relying on factors that are 
strongly correlated to race. Assume we change our hypothetical 
algorithm and remove the race factor altogether, but still use the 
location of the house as one of the factors. As has been established 
by decades of redlining neighborhoods,111 location can be an 
effective proxy for race in the context of providing insurance, 
banking services, health care, or many other types of services.112 As 
we saw earlier, current software used by police to predict crime 
patterns is highly location-specific, and it is certainly possible to 
imagine a scenario in which higher-crime areas track the racial 
makeup of specific neighborhoods.113 We can call this “indirect 
discrimination” as opposed to the unconstitutional direct 
discrimination that occurs when race is officially used as a factor.114
Nearly every predictive program that is currently in use has given 
rise to concerns about indirect discrimination.115 Thus, before law 
enforcement agents and judges officially use these programs to 
formally help them make their decisions, we need to determine 
whether it is legally or ethically permissible to use these nonracial 
elements that are correlated to race.
One way of answering this question is to note that proxies for 
race are already used in determinations of reasonable suspicion or 
111. The term “redlining” came from “residential security maps” that were 
used by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) in the 1930s to describe 
the quality of real estate investments in different parts of the city. Certain areas, 
known as “Type D” neighborhoods, were outlined in red on the map to indicate the 
riskiest areas for mortgages. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN 
BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 109 (2015). 
112. See id.
113. See supra Section I.A. 
114. The problem of indirect discrimination is related to a more sinister 
problem—that of intentional “masking.” Masking occurs when a decision-maker 
truly wishes to discriminate, but knows that doing so explicitly is forbidden. The 
decision-maker then intentionally chooses factors that are close statistical proxies for 
race and then uses them as factors. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, 
Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 692-93 (2016). Masking can 
occur when a decision-maker uses traditional clinical judgments as well when she 
uses mechanical predictions, but could be easier to achieve with big data methods. 
Id.
115. See, e.g., Stroud, supra note 33; Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/W6K7-XKME].
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probable cause. Police officers routinely testify that they made their 
observations in a “high crime area” as a factor that led to their 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.116 No doubt in many 
instances, higher-crime neighborhoods will tend to be inner city 
neighborhoods with higher proportions of certain minority groups117
(or at least this will be the perspective of many police officers and 
judges).118
And this formal use of proxies for race under the current 
system is likely only the tip of the iceberg. The unconscious (or 
conscious) racial biases of police officers and magistrates permeate 
every aspect of the front end of the criminal justice system.119 Under 
the current system, police officers disproportionately stop and frisk 
black and Latino suspects, and they are more likely to engage in 
violent and even lethal conduct when interacting with these 
116. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
117. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, METRO. POLICY 
PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, CITY AND SUBURBAN CRIME TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA 2-3 (May 2011), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/p66.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EW7Z-UDMT].
118. Proxies for race are also used at other stages of the criminal justice 
system. At bail hearings, for example, magistrates will routinely consider the prior 
criminal history of the defendant in deciding whether the defendant is a flight risk or 
a danger to others. See DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE BAIL REFORM 
ACT OF 1984, at 6 (3d ed. 2006), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailact3. 
pdf/$file/bailact3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3TL-79JA]. Criminal history is linked to 
race because certain ethnic groups have higher rates of conviction than others. See
George Gao, Chart of the Week: The Black-White Gap in Incarceration Rates, PEW 
RES. CTR. (July 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/18/chart-of-
the-week-the-black-white-gap-in-incarceration-rates/ [https://perma.cc/E45N-L6XQ].
Other factors that magistrates use, such as employment or home ownership, are 
strongly correlated to poverty, which is correlated to race. ADAIR, supra, at 6.
119. Of course, these biases permeate the rest of the criminal justice system 
as well, as evidenced by the statistics cited in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 227, 
293-99 (1987), and other studies showing biases in prosecutorial charging decisions, 
jury verdicts, and sentencing. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The 
Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805-22 (2012) (bias in charging decisions); Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court to Hear Case of Alleged Racial Bias by Juror, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-to-hear-case-
of-alleged-racial-bias-by-juror/2016/04/04/c9256e9c-fa92-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/9Q2M-CW3T] (bias by jurors); Edward Helmore, Racial 
Bias Evident in South Carolina Criminal Sentences, Study Reveals, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
29, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/29/racial-bias-
criminal-sentencing-south-carolina [https://perma.cc/2UFC-BLC2] (bias in sentencing). 
These biases, and ways in which to overcome them, are beyond the scope of this 
Article.
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suspects.120 The findings from the class action lawsuit challenging 
the expanded police stop and frisks in New York City121 found that 
over an eight-and-a-half-year period, 52% of all the citizens 
subjected to Terry stops were black, even though black citizens made 
up only 23% of the population.122 Studies have shown similar 
numbers in Philadelphia,123 Los Angeles,124 Boston,125 and on the 
New Jersey turnpike.126 Unlike the formal factors which can (at least 
in theory) be proven to be proxies for race, the use and effect of these 
informal decisions are difficult to detect and even more difficult to 
prove in court. These implicit biases on the part of police officers are 
also difficult to cure, even in the long run, since they exist in almost 
every individual, even those who harbor no conscious prejudices.127
In other words, the current system relies on personal, subjective 
clinical judgments that are based on some known factors (which are 
120. John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-
statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict [https://perma.cc/FT7P-QZTZ].
121. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 573-75 (2013). 
122. Id. at 574. This disproportionality cannot be explained by a higher rate 
of criminal activity by black citizens, since the “hit rate” for stopping black citizens 
was actually lower than that for white citizens—1.0% of the frisks of black citizens 
resulted in a weapon and 1.8% resulted in contraband, while 1.4% of the frisks of 
whites resulted in a weapon and 2.3% resulted in contraband. Id.
123. See Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk 
Practices, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 10-5952). 
124. See IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY 
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (Oct. 2008), 
https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-
Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YV-9H2Y]. The report shows that 
black residents are three times as likely to be the subject of a Terry stop as white 
residents, but that black residents are less likely to receive a citation after the stop, 
demonstrating that “African Americans are more often subject to stops without 
justification where no ticket could be issued.” ACLU OF S. CAL., RACIAL PROFILING 
AND THE LAPD: A SUMMARY OF PROFESSOR IAN AYERS’ REPORT ON RACIALLY 
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, https://www. 
aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/99227648-Racial-Profiling-the-LAPD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FHV5-4EQP].
125. See ACLU FOUND. OF MASS., BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A
REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010
(Oct. 2014), http://www.bostonherald.com/sites/default/files/media/2014/10/08/black_ 
brown_and_targeted_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VHB-Z5RH].
126. See John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That 
Prejudice Still Rules the Road, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND 
ESSENTIAL READINGS 32, 33 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010). 
127. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 
1491-528 (2005).
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explicitly described by the police officer or magistrate when 
requesting a warrant or justifying their decision) and some unknown 
factors (such as unconscious biases). Even for the explicitly listed 
known factors, the decision-makers do not (and likely could not) 
quantify the degree to which they relied on each individual factor. 
For example, assume a police officer is driving through a 
neighborhood and notices a young black man standing on the street 
corner. The young man is dressed in a way that is common to the 
neighborhood but that the police officer identifies as consistent with 
gang affiliation. The man then looks over at the officer, immediately 
places something in his pocket, and then walks briskly away from 
the officer. Assume at this point the officer honestly believes that 
there is a reasonable suspicion that the man is engaging in criminal 
activity (that is, the officer is not out to hassle the young man and is 
not simply stopping people indiscriminately in the hope of finding 
contraband). The officer then gets out of her car and orders the man 
to stop.
Later on, the officer is required to justify her stop by explaining 
why she believed she had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal 
activity was afoot. She lists the following factors:
(1) The action took place in a high crime neighborhood;
(2) The suspect hid an item after noticing a police officer;
(3) The suspect attempted to leave the scene after noticing a police officer.
The police officer does not list (and may not even be 
consciously aware of) other factors that led her to believe the suspect 
may have been engaged in criminal activity: 
(1) The suspect’s race (the officer subconsciously believes that black men 
are more likely to possess guns or drugs than white men);
(2) The suspect’s age (the officer believes that men in their twenties are 
more likely to be engaged in criminal activity than children or men over 
forty);
(3) The suspect’s gender (the officer believes that men are more likely to 
be carrying drugs or weapons than women); 
(4) The suspect’s clothing (which is actually common to the neighborhood 
but which the police officer subconsciously associates with criminals);
(5) The way the suspect looked at the police officer, which the officer 
couldn’t describe in testimony but which she associated with hostility to 
authority and to police specifically.
Racial bias played a role in the officer’s determination that the 
defendant was likely engaged in criminal activity, but it is impossible 
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to know to what degree. Of the formal elements, the fact that the 
encounter took place in a “high crime neighborhood” is likely 
correlated to race, but neither the officer nor the magistrate 
reviewing her conduct are able to explain exactly how important that 
factor was out of the three that were listed. And the fact that the 
suspect’s race led the officer to focus on this particular individual (as 
opposed to the young white man she observed standing on a different 
street corner two minutes before this interaction) may have played a 
significant role in her decision or a very minor role. Likewise, the 
suspect’s clothing (likely another proxy for race) may have been a 
strong motivator for her to act, or it may have been relatively 
insignificant. There is simply no way to measure, much less prove, 
the degree to which race or proxies for race influenced her decision 
to detain the suspect. Over the course of many years and tens of 
thousands of stops, a clear pattern will probably emerge that shows 
that this police department disproportionately stops people of color, 
but effective remedies at that point are hard to come by.
It is against this backdrop that we must evaluate any potential 
future use of predictive software. In contrast to the use of clinical 
judgments, predictive software will only base its results on the 
formal factors that are coded into its system. Thus, there will be no 
unconscious or hidden human biases that affect its decision. 
Furthermore, we can precisely quantify the degree to which each of 
the formal factors affects the result, so a judge (or a policymaker) 
can make an informed judgment as to whether certain factors that are 
proxies for race are dominating the calculation. In other words, under 
the current system of clinical judgments, the only way to infer 
indirect discrimination is by reviewing the aggregate results after 
many months or years have passed. Under a system of mechanical 
predictions, the level of indirect discrimination can be assessed even 
before a stop or a search occurs by examining the algorithm the 
police intend to use. Thus, the mechanical predictive algorithms can 
be designed to ignore (or at least minimize) improper factors such as 
race—something that may be impossible to do if we leave these 
determinations to the subjective determinations of police officers.128
All of this, however, depends on a high level of transparency in 
the algorithm itself, so that judges and other policymakers (including 
the police department that is considering adoption of the algorithm) 
can review the factors, their correlation (if any) to race, and the 
strength of any specific factor in reaching the result. We will 
128. See infra Section III.A and accompanying text.
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examine the challenges of achieving this level of transparency in Part 
III.
2. Preexisting Biases in the Underlying Data
A related concern about using mechanical predictions involves 
the underlying data that is used by the predictive algorithms. Put 
simply, if the underlying data is discriminatory, then the results that 
are based on that data will be discriminatory, and the supposedly 
color-blind algorithms will be doing nothing more than reinforcing 
the existing racial bias in the criminal justice system. In the civil 
context, commentators are beginning to pay close attention to these 
potential problems, noting that “[i]f a sample includes a 
disproportionate representation of a particular class . . . the results of 
an analysis of that sample may skew in favor of or against the over-
or underrepresented class.”129
As an example, assume that for the past twenty years a 
metropolitan police department has been disproportionately stopping, 
searching, and arresting black and Latino citizens. This 
disproportionate treatment does not stem from the fact that citizens 
from these groups are more likely to commit crimes, but from 
inherent racial biases in the criminal justice system, such as the 
tendency of police to engage with minorities more than with whites 
and the increased level of policing in minority neighborhoods.130
Assume also that these stops, searches, and arrests result in 
conviction at a higher rate than stops, searches, and arrests of white
citizens—again, not because the police are better at predicting crime 
for the minority citizens, but because of downstream biases in the 
criminal justice system: Because black and Latino defendants tend to 
be poorer,131 they are less likely to be able to afford private lawyers 
129. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 114, at 686.
130. This is, of course, not really a hypothetical case. Studies have shown, 
for example, that black citizens are nearly four times as likely to be arrested on 
charges of marijuana possession as white citizens, even though both blacks and 
whites use the drug at similar rates. In some states, black citizens were eight times as 
likely to be arrested. Ian Urbina, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests, 
Federal Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://nyti.ms/18KaQO5 [https:// 
perma.cc/K5XQ-VMJ6]. One of the reasons for this disparity is that “police 
departments, partly driven by a desire to increase their drug arrest statistics, can 
concentrate on minority or poorer neighborhoods to meet numerical goals.” Id.
131. See, e.g., Suzanne Macartney, Alemayehu Bishaw, and Kayla Fontenot, 
POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE 
AND PLACE: 2007–2011 at 1, American Community Survey Survey Briefs, United 
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and less likely to be able to afford bail; and because of conscious or 
subconscious prejudice on the part of prosecutors and judges, black 
and Latino defendants are more likely to be overcharged132 (leading 
to higher rates of plea bargaining) and more likely to be convicted by 
a jury if the case goes to trial.133
These discriminatory stops, searches, arrests, and convictions 
will become the underlying data for the city’s predictive algorithms, 
and they create two distinct problems for mechanical predictions. 
The first is related to the disproportionately high rate of encounters 
between the police and members of the minority community—the 
so-called “hassle” rate.134 This will create large amounts of data 
about certain individuals or areas of a city and disproportionately 
small amounts of data about other individuals or areas. Thus, when 
an algorithm determines whether a neighborhood is a “high crime 
area,” it will have a skewed interpretation of the frequency of crimes 
in different areas. This in turn will lead to more frequent searches of 
individuals in the “high crime areas,” which will create a self-
fulfilling prophecy as more individuals are stopped, searched, 
arrested, and thus convicted in those areas. Likewise, if an individual 
is determined to be at “high risk” for committing a crime, it could 
merely be reflecting the prejudices of police officers who have had 
previous encounters with the individual.135 Professor Bernard 
Harcourt refers to this as the “ratchet” effect: If certain factors are 
already perceived as leading to higher levels of criminal activity, a 
States Census Bureau (February 2013) (showing black and Latino poverty rates at 
twice those for white Americans), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3YX-VJ6Y].
132. Id. at 10-12; see also RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-
front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRV7-NFRG].
133. SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10-12 (Aug. 2013), http:// 
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shadow-Report-
ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR9M-3ZDJ].
134. See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464-65 (2015) 
(arguing that the “hassle rate”—the rate at which individuals are stopped by the 
police—is at least as important as the “hit rate”—the rate at which these encounters 
uncover criminal activity—because a low hassle rate will ensure that the police have 
particularized suspicion when they conduct their stops). We will discuss the problem 
of particularized suspicion in Subsection III.B.2, infra.
135. See generally Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing 
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016). 
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predictive algorithm will lead police and judges to conduct and 
authorize more searches on suspects who meet these factors, leading 
to more arrests that are linked to those factors.136
The second problem relates to the disproportionately high ratio 
of convictions to arrests for minority populations—what is usually 
referred to as the “hit” rate.137 The primary way to know whether a 
stop, search, or arrest is successful (is a “hit”) is by examining 
conviction rates. Thus, even if in fact the police do find contraband 
at the same rate for every ethnic group that is searched, if certain 
minority groups are convicted at a higher rate after the contraband is 
discovered, the statistics will indicate a higher hit rate for those 
minority groups than for others. In other words, because these 
citizens are unfairly convicted at a higher rate, the stops and searches 
that are conducted against them will appear to be more effective.138
As with the decision-making process itself, this problem is not 
new to mechanical predictions. The “data” that are used by police 
officers and judges today—their own personal experiences—is 
similarly flawed.139 The danger in moving towards a big data analysis 
in this context is not that a new problem will be created, but that—
despite big data’s promise of being color-blind and objective—the 
old problems will persist. Even worse, these old problems will 
become institutionalized and thus be even harder to successfully 
challenge and expose because they are presented as part of the “hard 
science” of big data. 
These problems with underlying data are not insoluble. The 
issue is common to many uses of big data, and it arises when 
statistics that are kept for one purpose are used for another.140 Stop-
and-frisk statistics and criminal conviction numbers are not recorded 
for the purposes of sophisticated statistical study; thus, those who 
collect them generally make no effort to correct for any biases 
inherent in the process.141 Part of the solution thus involves 
correcting the data—that is, estimating the rate of over-
136. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 145-71.
137. Id. at 112.
138. See Stroud, supra note 33 (discussing Chicago’s “heat list” and noting 
that “[f]rom what the CPD is willing to share, most of the collected information for 
the heat list is focused on rap sheets—arrest and conviction records. So rather than 
collecting information on everyone, they’re collecting and using information on 
people who have had interactions with the police”).
139. See Bambauer, supra note 134, at 473-74.
140. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 114, at 686 (“Data gathered for 
routine business purposes tend to lack the rigor of social scientific data collection.”). 
141. See id. at 674.
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representation of minorities in the hassle rates and hit rates and then 
adjusting the numbers accordingly.142 Another solution would be to 
use data from different sources, not just from information that results 
from police–citizen encounters. For example, algorithms could draw 
their underlying data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National 
Crime Victimization Survey,143 which tracks crimes based on victim 
reports, as opposed to the more traditional method of tracking crime 
through police reports.144
Once again, these solutions require real transparency as to the 
data being used. Courts and policymakers need to demand to see the 
source of the data used by the predictive algorithms and need to be 
given the tools to evaluate whether the data is representative of 
reality or the product of discriminatory decisions or unfair processes 
from the past.
B. Ensuring the Computer Looks for Individualized Suspicion
Individualized suspicion is a bedrock requirement of almost 
any police action that implicates the Fourth Amendment.145 If police 
officers knew that statistically speaking, 60% of everyone living in a 
certain building were guilty of possessing drugs, they would not be 
allowed to arrest everyone in the building, even though they would 
almost certainly have probable cause to believe that each person is 
guilty.146 The Fourth Amendment demands a certain level of 
142. Id. at 727.
143. See Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/ 
2DRN-VM9W] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
144. See, e.g., Uniform Crime Reporting, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/ucr#cius [https://perma.cc/46T7-XPCE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
145. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 
(1981). The only exception involves special needs searches, when police officers are 
(at least in theory) acting for a purpose other than crime control and are therefore 
permitted to conduct reasonable searches on defined groups of people (such as 
airline travelers, drivers, or students) in order to further that purpose. See, e.g., Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990).
146. For a detailed discussion of the individualization requirement, see 
Bambauer, supra note 134, at 490-94. Bambauer begins with a variation on this 
hypothetical, in which the police obtain results of a study that shows that 60% of all 
Harvard dorm rooms contain illegal drugs. Id. at 462. This is adopted from a 
hypothetical proposed by Professor Orin Kerr. See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should 
Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
135-37 (Michael Klarman, David Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., 2012). 
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particularity; that is, not merely a statistical likelihood that a suspect 
is guilty based on his membership in a certain group, but a reference 
to particular characteristics or actions by the suspect that shows that 
he specifically is likely to be guilty.147
One objection to using mechanical predictions is that they will 
dilute or even eliminate the individualization requirement by 
focusing on broad categories instead of the individual’s 
particularized conduct.148 Even if big data’s mechanical predictions 
could lead to more accurate results, it would be legally and morally 
wrong to punish a person based on membership in a specific group 
(such as economic class or age) instead of focusing on the person’s 
individual actions.149
In order to address this concern, we first have to define what 
we mean when we say that suspicion must be individualized.150 In 
general, we mean that police officers must look at the specific 
characteristics and actions of the suspect himself, and not determine 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause merely because the suspect is 
a member of a certain group. However, individualized suspicion does 
not preclude inferring facts about an individual based on his 
147. See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Search and Seizure in a Post-9/11 
World, 80 MISS. L.J. 1507, 1518 (2011) (arguing that “demographic probabilities” 
are insufficient to create probable cause or reasonable suspicion; the police must 
also notice something “specific to the defendant to create the probability as to him”).
148. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 86, at 1425-29; Michael L. Rich, 
Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 896-901 (2016). In fact, many of the objections to using 
statistical information in the criminal investigation process focus only on the 
requirement for individualized suspicion. See Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond 
Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 806-07 
(2013).
149. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 173-92. 
150. See Bambauer, supra note 134, at 469. Professor Bambauer examines 
(and rejects) four different conceptions of individualized suspicion: the need for 
case-by-case assessment, the need to engage in human intuition, the need to focus on 
conduct under the control of the suspect, and tracing suspicion from a crime to a 
suspect instead of from an individual to a crime. Id. at 469-82. She then proposes her 
own definition of individualization, which focuses on the “hassle rate”—that is, the 
proportion of the innocent population who were searched. Id. at 482-94. Using big 
data algorithms to determine reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not 
compatible with all of these definitions—for example, it downplays or eliminates the 
use of human intuition and will frequently start with an analysis of a suspect rather 
than with a crime. But these algorithms will be particularly useful if one adopts 
Professor Bambauer’s concept of hassle rates, since they focus on specific hit rates 
and miss rates that can easily be quantified and included in a crime prediction
algorithm. 
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membership in a certain group; it simply requires the presence of 
additional factors that are specific to the suspect. Even in the analog 
world of clinical judgments, police officers and judges routinely rely 
on assumptions about an individual based in part on the 
characteristics of their group. For example, police officers will give 
some weight to a suspect’s known gang affiliation, while magistrates 
making bail determinations will consider whether a defendant is 
unemployed or has a criminal record.
However, it would be inappropriate to stop, search, or arrest an 
individual solely based on his membership in a specific group.151
This would essentially be saying that the group characteristics of the 
individual are so suspicious that at any given moment there is reason 
to believe that he is likely to be engaging in criminal activity. In 
order to avoid this problem, courts have held that the police officer 
must observe conduct that gives her some reason to believe that the 
suspect is currently engaging in criminal activity.152 These actions 
may be legal (but suspicious) conduct, such as running from the 
police, exiting a location where drugs are known to be sold while 
sticking something in a pocket, or wearing a heavy coat on a summer 
day. Or they may be legal and innocuous conduct, such as 
purchasing a one-way ticket or traveling with no luggage. But the 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause cannot be based only on who 
the person is; it must also be based on what the person does.153
151. That is, it would be inappropriate to do so outside the context of a 
special needs search. See supra note 145.
152. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
153. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 388. Big Data Professor Ferguson 
further argues that there needs to be a link between the suspect’s suspicious 
background information and his current actions: “Courts analyzing big data 
suspicion should thus be careful to require a direct link between the past data about a 
suspect and the observed suspicion.” Id. Otherwise, Professor Ferguson argues that 
the background information is irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. It 
is not clear how “direct” the link would have to be; however, many different types of 
criminal activity may be linked together in an officer’s mind (such as prior 
convictions of illegal weapons possession combined with a current observation 
indicating possible drug dealing). Id. The linkage could be even more indirect—and 
yet statistically significant—when big data is used. For example, assume that a 
statistical analysis of thousands of burglars shows that individuals who have prior 
convictions for child abuse are 35% more likely to commit burglary than those 
without such a conviction. Even though there is no logical link between the two 
crimes, this fact could be considered as one factor (among many others) by an 
algorithm determining whether probable cause exists to believe a specific suspect is 
guilty of burglary. 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us of the need to 
consider the specific actions of the individual being searched. In 
Ybarra v. Illinois, law enforcement officers with a warrant to search 
a tavern decided to stop and frisk every individual inside the tavern, 
under the theory that mere presence in a tavern where drugs were 
being sold generated reasonable suspicion that a person possessed 
drugs.154 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that 
“the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than 
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked.”155
A mechanical prediction that is used to demonstrate reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause must meet these same criteria.156 Law 
school hypotheticals aside, it is hard to imagine a situation in the real 
world where group characteristics alone rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion, but it is theoretically possible that a 
mechanical prediction would arrive at such a result. Thus, any 
predictive software used to calculate whether reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause exists must require the observing officer to input the 
specific actions of the suspect as well as his general characteristics. 
The software would thus use these specific actions as part of its 
analysis, and it would be designed in such a way that it could not 
find reasonable suspicion or probable cause—regardless of the 
percentage chance of criminal activity occurring—unless the specific 
actions were a significant factor in the determination.157
C. Changing the Legal Standards
So far in evaluating the obstacles to adapting big data to 
criminal law, we have looked at the potential problems with the 
underlying data or the methods used to process that data. In other 
words, we have been concerned with shaping the way that 
mechanical predictions are made in order to ensure that they are 
consistent with the requirements of our criminal procedure 
jurisprudence. But even if these problems are solved, we face a 
potentially even greater obstacle: reshaping the criminal procedure 
jurisprudence so that it can use the information provided by big data. 
154. 444 U.S. 85, 87-89 (1979).
155. Id. at 94; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) 
(“[T]he process . . . must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being 
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.”).
156. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 387-88. 
157. If the software does not consider individualized suspicion, then police 
and judges must use it only as a factor in their analysis. See infra notes 276-282.
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Simply stated, the quantitative results from mechanical 
predictions are incompatible with the broad, flexible standards used 
by police and judges in the world of criminal procedure.158
Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are standards that have 
been intentionally kept vague by the courts. The Supreme Court has 
long resisted setting specific probabilities for the flexible concepts of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause,159 explaining that it is a 
“practical, nontechnical conception” which is “incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages.”160 The Court explains 
to us that the concepts are not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules”161 and then follows through on this promise by
providing a multitude of messy rules for police and lower courts to 
follow. Probable cause is defined as evidence that would “warrant a 
man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been 
committed” or as a “reasonable ground to believe that the accused 
[is] guilty.”162 Reasonable suspicion is defined as “obviously less 
demanding than . . . probable cause,”163 requiring merely “some 
minimal level of objective justification.”164
These definitions are rather unhelpful in providing guidance or 
clarity as to when a stop or a search is appropriate. No lay person 
would possibly know what these terms mean in the real world; police 
officers and law students must study dozens of fact patterns from 
case law to get a sense of what kinds of factors will create reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. Forty-five years ago, one law professor 
surveyed 166 federal judges to ask them to quantify the concept of 
158. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (describing 
probable cause as a “fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 
set of legal rules”). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (“We think 
the Court of Appeals’ effort to refine and elaborate the requirements of ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ in this case creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the 
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In evaluating the 
validity of a stop such as this, we must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances—
the whole picture.’” (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417)); Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 
(describing probable cause as a “fluid concept”).
160. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003).
161. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
162. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). In another case, the 
Court noted that probable cause “deal[s] with probabilities. These are not technical; 
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
163. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
164. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984). 
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probable cause, and the results ranged from ten percent to ninety 
percent.165 The same group of judges was asked to quantify the 
concept of reasonable suspicion, and most judges gave responses 
between ten percent and sixty percent.166
This imprecision has its costs: It creates inconsistency from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from judge to judge and it makes 
it harder for police to know whether their actions are legal at the time 
they take those actions.167 It also forces magistrates and judges to rely 
on the subjective descriptions and personal judgments of the police 
officers, since these vague standards breed vague descriptions to 
meet those standards, such as “high crime neighborhood,” “acting 
nervous,” and “suspicious hand movements.” Police officers who 
testify to these factors are usually not acting in bad faith; they are 
merely trying to find ways to satisfy an ambiguous legal standard. 
Perhaps worst of all, the imprecise standards make it difficult to 
evaluate the constitutionality of law enforcement actions on a larger 
scale. Assume that a study of all probable-cause-based automobile 
searches in a jurisdiction demonstrated that 32% of the time, the 
police found contraband. Does this mean that the police in this 
jurisdiction are following the law or that they are violating people’s 
rights? Without any quantification of the standard, it is impossible to
tell.
To some extent, the imprecision of these terms was a necessary 
evil. If the Supreme Court had instructed police that they needed to 
be at least 20% certain of an individual’s guilt before conducting a 
165. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of 
Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982). The 
vast majority of the judges were between the 30% and 60% range—16% answered 
30%, 27% answered 40%, 31% answered 50%, and 15% answered 60%—still 
indicating a wide range of disagreements. Id.
166. Id. at 1327-28. Although a few outlying judges (somewhat inexplicably) 
answered 0% or 100%, the vast majority of judges were within the 10% to 60% 
range: 15% answered 10%, 20% answered 20%, 30% answered 30%, 13% answered 
40%, 14% answered 50%, and 5% answered 60%. Id. The study also shows that the 
definition of probable cause is not just vague but also likely misleading: It purports 
to require evidence sufficient to support a belief that an offense has been committed, 
which would seem to mean that it is more likely than not that an offense has been 
committed. Id. at 1327. However, the average probability from the judges was 
44.5%—below the “more likely than not” standard. Id. at 1332. The First Circuit 
agreed with this formulation, holding that probable cause was a lower standard than 
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 
1979). In other words, “probable cause” does not actually mean “probable”; it means 
something that is close to probable. See infra notes 242-245 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
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Terry stop, the precise quantification would not have helped 
individual officers in making their on-the-spot decisions. It makes 
more sense for officers to be given some broad guidelines (e.g., 
“more than a mere hunch” or “some level of objective justification 
required”) and then teach them through training and trial and error 
what courts will approve and what they will not (e.g., observing a 
suspect leave a known crack house and then run from a uniformed 
police officer constitutes reasonable suspicion; observing a suspect 
leave a known crack house with no other suspicious behavior does 
not). Similarly, telling a magistrate that she should only issue the 
warrant if there is a 45% chance of finding contraband would be 
unlikely to help her make the decision in a world of clinical 
judgments. The magistrate must consider the myriad of subjective 
factors from the police officer’s affidavit: the credibility of an 
informant, the reports of unusual but not blatantly illegal activity, 
and so on. Given the messiness of the evidence confronted by police 
and judges, a messy standard makes the most sense. Such a standard 
allows the decision-makers to follow their intuition and make a 
subjective judgment about whether “something seems not right about 
this situation” (reasonable suspicion) or “I believe there is a good 
chance that a crime has been committed” (probable cause).168 Indeed, 
many judges who were polled about percentages for probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion in the 1981 survey refused to answer the 
questions, arguing that using percentages would be “misleading 
because burdens of proof deal with qualitative judgments rather than 
quantitative judgments.”169
Numerous scholars have also objected to creating specific 
quantifiable standards. For example, Professor Orin Kerr argues that 
quantification of probable cause would lead to less accurate probable 
cause determinations because warrant applications only provide a 
limited amount of information, and under the current system, judges 
are able to use their intuition to account for the missing facts.170
Professor Kerr argues that when a judge gets a warrant application, 
168. Judges seem to reject quantitative standards as well. Rita James Simon, 
Judges’ Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, in THE 
TRIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE 113 (John J. Kennelly, James P. Chapman & William J. 
Harte eds., 1969). In the survey of 400 trial court judges from the late 1960s, judges 
were asked whether they would approve of using specific percentages or 
probabilities in determining standards of proof, and “[t]he judges were almost 
unanimous in their rejection of the proposal for both criminal and civil trials.” Id.
169. McCauliff, supra note 165, at 1332.
170. Kerr, supra note 146, at 132. 
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she only sees the selective facts that the police want her to see: 
investigative techniques that successfully found evidence to build 
towards probable cause.171 But the application will not describe any 
investigative techniques that were used that failed to find evidence 
nor will it describe any possible investigative techniques that could 
have been used that were not used.172 In the current non-quantified 
world, Professor Kerr argues, judges can use their intuition about 
what might be missing from the warrant application, and judges will 
instinctively (and perhaps subconsciously) factor that into their 
decision.173 If the probable cause standard became quantified, at, say, 
40%, judges would merely calculate the odds (incorrectly) based on 
the selective facts in the affidavit and would suppress their natural 
intuition to be suspicious about the facts that might not have been 
included.
Although Professor Kerr claims his argument is based on the 
value of judicial intuition, it is really about the need for 
particularized suspicion. He uses an example of law enforcement 
who have a well-documented study that 60% of all Harvard dorm 
rooms contain illegal drugs, and he posits that police officers attempt 
to use that study to get a warrant to search a specific dorm room.174 A
judge would rightfully be suspicious of this request, he argues, 
because the judge’s intuition would make her wonder why the police 
have chosen this room in particular—thus leading to the conclusion 
that she is not getting the full story from the police.175 But this is 
merely a restatement of the requirement that suspicion be 
particularized—that the affidavit must contain some information that 
links this specific suspect to the illicit activity. And as noted 
above,176 this is an important consideration in designing big data’s 
algorithms for criminal law application—we need to either ensure 
that the inputs contained some reference to the individual actions or 
behavior of the suspect himself, or allow for police and judges to add 
in their own observations of individual activity.177
171. Id. at 133-34.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 137-39.
174. Id. at 135-37.
175. Id. at 138-39.
176. See supra Section II.B.
177. Professor Kerr’s objection to quantification also focuses on the inability 
of judges to use specific numerical probabilities in their decision-making process 
and the cognitive biases that would prevent them from using probability numbers 
appropriately. For example, Professor Kerr discusses the representative heuristic and 
anchoring effects, both of which tend to make individuals misjudge numerical 
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A more troubling critique of using predictive algorithms is the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that the decision-maker use a “totality 
of the circumstances” test in determining whether reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause exist.178 Professor Michael Rich argues 
that a predictive algorithm can never determine probable cause on its 
own because the algorithm is by definition limited in the factors that 
it considers in making its determination.179 A predictive algorithm 
might be programmed to consider only a handful of factors, or it 
might be programmed to consider hundreds of factors, but it can 
never consider every factor that could possibly be relevant to a 
probable cause analysis.180 A human being at least has the potential 
to incorporate new observations, but a predictive algorithm is limited 
by its previous programming.181
One response to this critique is that it somewhat misrepresents 
what the Court means by “totality of the circumstances.” This 
requirement does not mean that the decision-maker must consider 
every possible factor—that would be impossible for a human being 
or a computer. Indeed, courts have noted that once a police officer 
has established that probable cause exists, the officer is under no 
further duty to investigate or gather exculpatory data.182 Instead, 
“totality of the circumstances” means two things. 
First, courts should reject a formalistic checklist of factors 
(such as the pre-Gates “two pronged” test)183 and be willing to 
consider many different factors in deciding whether probable cause 
probabilities, sometimes quite dramatically. This argument has broader implications
for adopting big data’s mechanical predictions, which will be discussed in Section 
III.B, infra.
178. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
179. See Rich, supra note 148, at 897-98.
180. Id. at 897.
181. Id. Professor Rich gives an example of a predictive algorithm that 
considers location, time of day, facial recognition technology, prior criminal activity 
and other background information, and then adds in the specific behavior that a 
certain suspect is approaching multiple people on the street and briefly engaging in a 
hand-to-hand transaction with each of them. Id. at 898. The algorithm predicts a 
strong possibility of drug dealing. Id. A police officer who investigates notices that 
(1) the suspect does not change his behavior when he sees the police officer; and 
(2) a person who just engaged in a hand-to-hand transaction with the subject drops a 
church flyer on the ground immediately after the encounter. Id. The predictive 
algorithm did not account for these extra observations, which almost certainly 
obliterate the probable cause conclusion, but any human being would be able to 
process this new data appropriately. Id.
182. See Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999).
183. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 106, 114 (1964).
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exists.184 Certainly a predictive algorithm can be designed to consider 
hundreds of different factors, far more than the average police officer 
observing the scene and far more than are typically included in an 
affidavit in a warrant application.185 It is true that no predictive 
algorithm will ever be able to consider every relevant factor, whether 
inculpatory or exculpatory. But of course this is also true for police 
officers and judges. In fact, predictive algorithms could conceivably 
process thousands of different factors, many more than a human 
being could. 
It is easy to come up with examples of cases in which a police 
officer makes an observation that is not programmed into the 
predictive algorithm and which dramatically increases (or decreases) 
the level of suspicion in a situation, but it is equally easy—if not 
easier—to think of examples in which a predictive algorithm 
considers relevant factors that an average police officer would never 
consider. Many of the factors that human police officers consider to 
be relevant may in fact be irrelevant or may be given insufficient 
weight or too much weight. And, as many commentators have 
pointed out, some of the “intuitions” of police officers and even
judges are grounded in implicit racial bias, making their conclusions 
not just inaccurate but also discriminatory.186
Second, the police and courts must also consider potential 
exculpatory evidence as part of the totality of the circumstances, 
since certain observations or background facts may lower the level of 
suspicion.187 Predictive algorithms can—and should—be 
programmed to consider possible exculpatory evidence as well, and 
to weigh that evidence in reaching their conclusions. 
In short, quantifying these standards will allow police and 
judges to use predictive algorithms, bringing a number of benefits: 
the opportunity to reduce discriminatory bias in the system; greater 
accountability for police actions; and a higher level of accuracy (that 
is, fewer searches of those who are innocent and more searches of 
184. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-33, 238-39 (1983). The Supreme 
Court noted that a magistrate’s job in reviewing a warrant application was “simply 
to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238.
185. See Rich, supra note 148, at 895-901.
186. See id. at 897-900; L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the 
Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012); see also supra notes 121-126 and 
accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000).
Quantifying Criminal Procedure 993
those who are in fact engaged in criminal activity). There is nothing 
inherent about these tests that would forbid courts from adopting 
quantitative standards, but courts have been extremely reluctant to do 
so.188 In the next Part, we will talk about the feasibility of such a 
shift. 
III. MAKING BIG DATA WORK IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Under current law, a police officer seeking a search warrant 
states that she believes there is probable cause to believe that 
contraband will be found in the suspect’s house, and a judge 
appraises that assertion by reviewing and evaluating the facts that the 
police officer places in her affidavit, including the credibility of any 
informants (and of the police officer herself). The judge then reaches 
her own conclusion about whether a person of reasonable caution 
would believe that contraband is present at the location. 
In a world of predictive algorithms, the police officer will 
instead present the magistrate with the output of a computer program 
which states that there is a 40% chance that contraband will be found 
in the suspect’s house. The judge will then examine the algorithm 
that was used to ensure that it meets the appropriate legal standards 
and will then make a ruling as to whether the 40% prediction is 
sufficient to establish probable cause. Depending on the 
circumstances, the judge may make a decision based solely on the 
output of the algorithm (the “outcome determinative” model), or she 
may consider the output of the algorithm as one factor to combine 
with other relevant facts (the “formal factor” model).
As we have seen in the previous Parts, in order to reach this 
world we must overcome a number of obstacles. First, the judge 
needs to know that the computer is not using discriminatory factors 
or data that merely reinforces past discrimination. Second, the judge 
will need to confirm that at least some of the factors used by the 
computer are specific to this particular suspect and that the 40% 
figure is not merely derived from aggregate group probability 
figures. If the algorithm has no factors that are based on 
individualized suspicion, a judge needs to combine the 40% result 
with specific facts about this particular suspect in order to arrive at 
her own prediction. And finally, we need to know whether the 40% 
chance of finding contraband (or whatever number the judge settles 
on after factoring in other information) is sufficient to convince a 
188. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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judge that a person of reasonable caution would believe that 
contraband is present. In order to overcome this final problem, courts 
must overcome their hostility to quantifying the legal standards that 
make up the backbone of criminal procedure. 
Thus, in order to create a system where police officers and 
judges use data-centric mechanical predictions in making their 
decisions, two major changes must occur. First, the predictive 
algorithms must be sufficiently transparent to allow judges to ensure 
that the algorithm is not relying upon unconstitutional factors, either 
directly or indirectly, in reaching its conclusions. Transparency is 
also required so that judges can ensure that at least some of the 
factors leading to this number are specific to this particular suspect. 
And as we will see, transparency is also necessary so that judges can 
add additional factors to these algorithms in order to adjust their 
results to the facts of a specific case. Second, courts must overcome 
their resistance to quantifying these legal standards, so that the 
numerical results from mechanical predictions can be applied to 
these legal determinations. As part of overcoming that reluctance, in 
some cases judges must also become comfortable with manipulating 
these probabilities and combining them with other factors in order to 
reach their own independent conclusions.
A. Transparent Algorithms and Data Sets
The first step is to convince companies who make these 
algorithms to share the details of their operation—if not the source 
code, at least the factors that their predictive models consider and the 
weight that the models assign to each factor. The transparency 
requirement is necessary not only for the algorithm itself but also for 
the underlying data sets, in order to avoid the ratchet effect discussed 
earlier.189 Courts need to be able to examine the underlying evidence 
being used by the algorithm to ensure that they are not already 
tainted by race or by proxies for race—and if they are, the data sets 
need to be adjusted in order to remove the taint. Greater transparency 
for the data sets will also help with another growing problem with 
our increasing reliance on big data: erroneous information in the 
government and private databases upon which these algorithms 
rely.190 As we have seen earlier, police are already relying on these 
predictive algorithms to direct resources and place certain people 
189. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
190. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 13-14.
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under suspicion, so cleansing the algorithms of discriminatory 
factors and purging inaccurate information is already long overdue.
Another reason to mandate transparency is to ensure that the 
individualized suspicion requirement is met. As noted above,191 some 
predictive algorithms may base their conclusions solely on group 
membership and external factors, thus violating the legal requirement 
that reasonable suspicion or probable cause be based on 
individualized suspicion. If the inputs used by the algorithm are open 
for the judge to examine, then she can ensure that the conclusion is 
based on the appropriate level of individual activity. And if there are 
no inputs based on individualized suspicion, the judge must demand 
additional facts from the law enforcement officer in order to 
establish individualized suspicion—that is, she will be forced to 
switch from an “outcome determinative” use of predictive algorithms 
to a “formal factor” model. 
Unfortunately, up until now, companies have been extremely 
secretive about the details of their predictive algorithms, presumably 
because they consider these details to be valuable proprietary 
information.192 The company that provides the Beware software to 
police departments does not even allow the police departments to 
know the details of the algorithm.193 Recently, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) had to make a public records request to the 
Fresno police, seeking information about the factors used by its 
predictive software; the results still did not provide anything like the 
kind of transparency necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
program.194 This secrecy is not limited to private corporations; even 
191. See supra notes 145-155 and accompanying text.
192. Jouvenal, supra note 30.
193. George Hostetter, In Wake of Paris, Fresno P.D. Rolls out Big Data to 
Fight Crime, CVOBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.cvobserver.com/crime/in-
wake-of-paris-fresno-p-d-rolls-out-big-data-to-fight-crime/4/ [https://perma.cc/7MNX-
ZB8B]. For example, the police were asked at a city council meeting whether a 
misdemeanor conviction alone would be enough for the program to conclude that 
the suspect was “red,” the highest level of danger. Id.
194. Matt Cagle, This Surveillance Software Is Probably Spying on 
#BlackLivesMatter, ACLU S. CAL. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.aclusocal.org/ 
mediasonar/ [https://perma.cc/58YX-LATJ]. The result of the public records request 
was eighty-eight pages of emails that included lists of “high frequency social media 
terms” that could be indicative of criminal activity. Id. (follow “88 pages of 
documents” hyperlink; then see E-mail from Media Sonar to Angeline MacIvor (Jan. 
27, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.aclunc.org/docs/201512-social_media_monitoring_ 
softare_pra_response.pdf [https://perma.cc/93NK-YC3V]).
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private individuals who design these algorithms refuse to disclose 
exactly how they work.195
Thus far, this secrecy has not posed significant legal problems, 
since predictive algorithms are only being used to direct police 
resources. But this is likely to change in the near future, regardless of 
whether police and courts begin to use predictive algorithms to 
establish legal cause to stop or search. There is growing concern that 
the use of mechanical predictions is merely a sophisticated form of 
racial profiling,196 and if police want to continue to use algorithms in 
any capacity, they will need to reveal (or require their client 
companies to reveal) the details of these algorithms. This greater 
transparency will not only reassure the public (and the courts) that 
the determinative factors used by the algorithm are not related to 
race, but it will also lay the groundwork for adopting these 
algorithms more formally into the legal system. And, not 
incidentally, it may reveal that some algorithms are relying on 
forbidden factors in reaching their conclusions, which of course 
would require the algorithm to be redesigned with the offending 
factors removed. The ACLU’s recent public records request, for 
example, revealed that one of the Fresno Police Department’s 
predictive software algorithms used the social media hashtag 
#BlackLivesMatter as a risk factor for “police hate crimes.”197
But requiring the software engineers and statisticians who 
design mechanical predictions to reveal the factors being used and 
the weights assigned to each factor is only the first step. Modern day 
predictive software is not static; the more sophisticated algorithms 
will adjust the factors as they go, learning from past experience. As 
195. Stroud, supra note 33. In fact, the Chicago Police Department refused to 
even reveal the names of the people on their “heat list,” because they argue such 
disclosure could endanger the safety of law enforcement officers or the general 
population. Id. They have revealed some of the factors that they use, such as 
criminal records, social circles, gang connections, and whether the suspect has been 
a victim of an assault or a shooting. See Eligon & Williams, supra note 36.
Unfortunately, a partial release of certain factors does little to address the 
transparency concerns discussed in this Article.
196. See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Future of Crime-Fighting or the Future of 
Racial Profiling?: Inside the Effects of Predictive Policing, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 
28, 2016, 7:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/predictive-policing-video_ 
us_56f898c9e4b0a372181a42ef [https://perma.cc/BK5D-V9JM].
197. Cagle, supra note 194 (follow “88 pages of documents” hyperlink; then 
see E-mail from Media Sonar to Angeline MacIvor (Jan. 27, 2015, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/201512-social_media_monitoring_softare_pra_response.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93NK-YC3V]).
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the algorithm makes thousands or millions of predictions, it will be 
told which of those predictions ended up being accurate, and it will 
change the weight assigned to each of its factors accordingly to 
improve its accuracy. This process, known as machine learning,198
ensures that the algorithm’s mechanical predictions improve with 
time, but it makes it even more difficult for the courts to evaluate the 
degree to which each factor is relevant to the machine’s 
conclusions.199 As one scholar has noted, “[F]orecasting becomes a
distinct activity that differs from explanation. . . . What matters most 
is forecasting accuracy. Combining explanation with forecasting can 
compromise both.”200 In other words, the most accurate algorithms—
those that use machine learning to sift through millions of different 
data points—may be the least transparent.201
However, as we have seen in other contexts in the criminal 
justice system, it is possible to overcome these obstacles. A judge 
does not really need an intricate understanding of the underlying 
code of the algorithm; she only needs to know (1) the factors that the 
algorithm used and (2) the historical accuracy of algorithm’s 
results.202 Although the experts who design the algorithm need to 
consider hundreds or thousands of data points in order to determine 
which ones are the most predictive, for practical reasons the actual 
algorithm will probably only use eight or nine factors, just like the 
sentencing risk assessment tools.203 Thus, the first piece of 
198. Machine learning is defined as the following process: “A computer 
program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and 
performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves 
with experience E.” TOM M. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2 (1997).
199. See RICHARD BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE 
LEARNING APPROACH 110-11 (2012).
200. Id. at 111.
201. See Rich, supra note 148, at 886 (“Absent an intentional decision to the 
contrary, machine learning tends to create models that are so complex that they 
become ‘black boxes,’ where even the original programmers of the algorithm have 
little idea exactly how or why the generated model creates accurate predictions. On 
the other hand, when an algorithm is interpretable, an outside observer can 
understand what factors the algorithm relies on to make its predictions and how 
much weight it gives to each factor. Interpretability comes at a cost, however, as an 
interpretable model is necessarily simpler—and thus often less accurate—than a 
black box model.”).
202. Some would argue that the judge would also need to know the weights 
that the algorithm assigned to each factor, so that the judge would be better able to 
accurately add in other factors if she was using a “formal factor” model. If so, the 
program could be designed to provide explicit percentages for each factor every time 
it produces a result. 
203. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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information should be easy for law enforcement to provide, since 
presumably it is law enforcement officers who input the data. And 
the accuracy of the results should easily be available, since an 
integral part of developing big data’s algorithms is to calculate (and 
then improve on) the accuracy of the predictions that are being made. 
Once the judge obtains this information, she would then need 
to evaluate (1) whether the specific inputs are proxies for a forbidden 
factor, such as race,204 and (2) whether they contain sufficient 
particularity to justify the stop, search, or arrest.205 In other words, 
the judge does not need to know exactly how the algorithm arrived at 
its results, only which factors it considered in doing so. The judge 
would also have to determine whether the accuracy of the algorithm 
is sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
standard, a question we turn to in the next Section.
And if a judge did want to understand the way the algorithm 
processed the inputs, she would not have to personally decipher the 
meaning of the underlying source code, much less understand the 
evolution of the data in a machine learning environment. Just as 
judges hear from experts in a Daubert hearing when they are called 
upon to determine the reliability of a new and complex scientific 
process, a judge who is called upon to evaluate the methodology and 
reliability of a predictive algorithm could also listen to experts 
testifying from both sides.206
This transparency requirement should be seen not as a 
weakness of adopting mechanical predictions but as one of its 
strengths. Courts currently rely on a combination of their own 
intuition (an internal, subjective algorithm) and experience (an 
internal, limited database) when reviewing the decisions of a police 
officer (decisions that are made based on a combination of the police 
officer’s intuition and experience). It has already been conclusively 
demonstrated that these intuitions are subject to significant levels of 
racial bias,207 but it is difficult for a magistrate to know if (or to what 
degree) her own intuition may be suffering from this problem. 
Likewise, the magistrate’s personal experiences are likely based in 
part on problematic data. These hidden biases are very difficult to 
204. See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
205. See supra Section II.B.
206. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
207. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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remove from a person’s decision-making process.208 With the proper 
transparency requirements, however, these biases can be easily 
detected in algorithms and data sets of mechanical predictions.
B. Quantifying the Legal Standards
Lack of transparency is not only a problem for those who 
collect and process the data, but also for those who use the data—
that is, the judges who apply the legal standards. If the quantified 
results from the world of big data are going to be used effectively in 
the courts, judges will need to update the legal standards that they 
use.
1. Setting a Number
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of adopting predictive 
algorithms is determining the quantified percentage to match up with 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.209 The vagueness of the 
current rules obscures any attempt to determine how much suspicion 
is actually necessary to reach these standards, and courts have 
routinely stated that these standards should not or even cannot be 
reduced to mere numerical probabilities.210 But if the criminal justice 
system is going to benefit from the increased accuracy and potential 
reduction of unfair bias that is offered by predictive algorithms, 
courts will need to overcome their hostility to quantification.
Quantifying these standards may lead to other benefits as well. 
One positive side effect of greater quantification is the possibility of 
creating precise standards for different situations—what Professor 
Christopher Slobogin refers to as the proportionality principle.211
Courts (or legislatures) could craft specific standards for the most 
intrusive searches (such as wiretaps or bodily intrusions) and lower 
208. See Sendhil Mullainathan, Racial Bias, Even When We Have Good 
Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/upshot/the-
measuring-sticks-of-racial-bias-.html?abt=0002&abg=1 [https://perma.cc/6QBT-6BJA].
209. As the use of predictive algorithms becomes more widespread, other 
legal standards, such as “flight risk” in the bail context, may also need to be 
quantified. See supra Section I.D.
210. See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text. 
211. Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of 
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1081-85 (1998) 
[hereinafter Slobogin, Proportionality Principle]; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 31-41 (2007).
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standards on a sliding scale as searches become less invasive 
(searches of homes, searches of cars, searches of offices, frisks, 
flyovers, surveilling public spaces).212 Of course, courts and 
legislatures already have created these different standards to some 
degree,213 but the lack of quantification has made this process 
confusing and limited the number of “tiers” that can realistically be 
created. 
Other commentators have argued that quantifying the probable 
cause standard would enable courts to adopt a sliding scale based on 
the severity of the crime being investigated.214 Courts have so far 
been reluctant to entertain this idea, generally holding that one 
standard should apply across the board to every criminal 
investigation.215 But as Professor Craig Lerner has pointed out, courts 
have dropped some hints that the probable cause standard should be 
lower for police investigating a mass shooting or a kidnapped child 
than they would be for a low-level drug possession case.216 Judge 
Richard Posner, for example, writing an en banc decision for the 
Seventh Circuit, held that probable cause should be “a function of 
the gravity of the crime” in the context of exigent circumstances.217
212. Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 211. Professor Slobogin 
would also require a greater showing for the most intrusive searches, such as 
wiretaps or bodily intrusions; not just a 75% likelihood but also “clear and 
convincing proof that the evidence thereby sought is crucial to the state’s case and 
that the search will be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible.” Id. at 1082-
83.
213. See Ric Simmons, The New Reality of Search Analysis: Four Trends 
Created by New Surveillance Technologies, 81 MISS. L.J. 991, 999-1004 (2012).
214. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 951, 1014-22 (2003); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common 
Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 504-
05 (1984); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 229-31 (1984).
215. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
216. Lerner, supra note 214, at 1015-17. Professor Lerner ultimately 
proposes a formula for determining probable cause, similar to the Learned Hand 
formula for negligence claims, which takes into account the severity of the crime 
and the intrusiveness of the search. Id. at 1019-22. 
217. Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
Other Justices and judges have also hinted at the need for a sliding scale, though the 
hints are usually made in dissents. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the societal interest in searching a 
car trunk for a kidnapped child was greater than the societal interest in searching a 
car trunk for bootlegged alcohol, and thus he would be tempted to make an 
“exception” to the Fourth Amendment in the former case); United States v. Soyka, 
394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (“[T]he gravity 
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This type of sliding scale would be all but impossible to administer 
with the current broad standards; only with greater precision can 
courts make meaningful distinctions in different contexts.
Professor Erica Goldberg also points out that the imprecise 
nature of the current standards for probable cause tends to create a 
very low bar in practice because of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.218 Under this exception, even if a reviewing court 
finds that a warrant lacked probable cause, the illegally obtained 
evidence will still be admissible as long as the officer acted in good 
faith—that is, as long as the warrant was not “so lacking in . . . 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable.”219 A vague probable cause standard means that many 
warrants that fall short of the probable cause standard will in practice 
result in evidence that can be used in trial, as long as the lack of 
probable cause was not obvious to the officer.220 If the probable 
cause standard were quantified, it could also be enforced with more 
regularity against police officers, who would be much less able to 
claim the good faith exception when a warrant did not in fact meet 
the proper standard.
There is a possibility that if we use actual data to run these 
analyses, we will learn that our standards for stops, arrests, and 
warrants are embarrassingly low. For example, we may learn that the 
standard hit rate for Terry stops is 2% and the average hit rate for 
search warrants is 10%—that is, that police officers conduct Terry
stops on individuals with only a one in fifty chance that the suspect is 
engaged in criminal activity; and judges are issuing search warrants 
even though there is only a one in ten chance of finding contraband 
at the named location. We may also learn that these rates vary wildly 
depending on the jurisdiction,221 the suspected crime, and (as we 
have already seen) the race of the suspect.222 This information will be 
yet another fringe benefit of shifting to a quantitative model. If 
courts learn that they are in fact using a 2% rate for reasonable 
suspicion, we can have a real debate about whether this number is 
too low, and if so, what the number ought to be. Such a debate is 
of the suspected crime and the utility of the police action [should be] factors bearing 
on the validity of the search or arrest decision.”).
218. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 802-05.
219. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
220. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 804-05.
221. See id. at 802-03.
222. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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nearly impossible to have now because the current standards are 
shrouded in intentionally ambiguous legalese. 
Once we agree on a number, that number can be imposed 
consistently throughout the country. No longer will individuals in the 
city be subjected to one standard while individuals in the suburb 
receive a more deferential standard. Similar standards will apply to 
those suspected of tax fraud as to those suspected of possessing 
heroin. This type of equality is simply not feasible under our current 
system.
Yet another benefit to quantification will be greater 
transparency in the factors that police and courts use to make these 
decisions.223 For example, consider the case law surrounding Terry
frisks, which shows courts struggling to determine when there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect is armed. One commonly 
cited factor is the type of crime the person is suspected of having 
committed. Courts have consistently held that some crimes, such as 
robbery,224 narcotics trafficking,225 growing large amounts of 
marijuana,226 rape,227 or burglary,228 all involve a high risk of the 
suspect carrying a weapon and are thus a legitimate factor in 
determining whether the suspect is armed.229 But is the nature of the 
crime enough on its own to create reasonable suspicion? Is it enough 
when combined with one other observation by the police officer, 
such as a “furtive move” or a “suspicious bulge”?
Generally, courts will find that if the officer reasonably 
believes that the suspect is guilty of one of these “weapons likely” 
223. See, e.g., Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1436-37 n.172 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court “has 
not defined [the probable cause] standard in a manner that is particularly 
illuminating to those charged with enforcing and interpreting the criminal law”); 
Goldberg, supra note 148, at 833 (noting that even in the absence of quantitative 
evidence, “assigning a numerical value to probable cause can still assist judges in 
making probable cause determinations, so long as they appreciate that this number 
serves only as a reference”).
224. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). 
225. See, e.g., United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 
1086-87 (9th Cir. 2000).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2008).
227. See, e.g., People v. Shackelford, 546 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Colo. App. 1976).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000).
229. As it turns out, the court’s assumptions about which crimes carry a high 
chance of weapons being present is sometimes correct and sometimes not. The 
Bureau of Justice study revealed that a person committing a robbery does have a 
high probability of carrying a weapon (34.5%), but that burglary (4%), sexual 
assault (2.9%) and narcotics trafficking (7.8%) do not. HARLOW, supra note 52, at 3.
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crimes, then that belief is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion 
that a suspect is armed.230 But surely the risk of a suspect carrying a 
weapon is not identical for all five of those crimes—so in theory 
courts should require some corroboration in the case of certain 
suspected crimes and less (or none) in the case of others. This is not 
what happens: Courts merely state that the suspected crime is “likely 
to involve the use of weapons”231 and then generally find that the 
frisk was justified. Meanwhile, other suspected crimes, such as 
passing counterfeit money232 or possession of illegal drugs,233 are 
held to not be a legitimate factor—that is, an individual suspected of 
these crimes has absolutely no greater likelihood than anyone else to 
be carrying a weapon. In reaching these conclusions, courts generally 
rely on their intuition rather than any actual evidence that indicates 
the prevalence (or dearth) of weapons on suspects who commit these 
crimes. And in the absence of empirical evidence, courts create a 
false binary categorization: Suspicion of certain crimes generates 
reasonable suspicion on its own, while suspicion of other crimes 
does not add to the probability of a weapon being present.
Occasionally, courts do venture into the realm of data when 
deciding whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exist, with 
decidedly mixed results. In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit attempted 
to determine if suspicion of domestic violence was a legitimate 
factor in determining whether the individual was armed.234 The 
majority held that suspicion of domestic violence did not increase the 
likelihood of the suspect possessing a weapon. To support its 
conclusion, the court cited studies that concluded that “domestic 
violence calls for service account for a relatively small proportion of 
the overall rate of police officers murders” and that 36.7% of 
domestic violence victims had at some point in their lives been 
threatened or harmed by a weapon during a domestic violence 
incident.235 The dissent cited FBI studies demonstrating that 33% of 
assaults on police officers in a recent year were committed while 
police were responding to “disturbance calls,” which is “a category 
which includes domestic violence calls,” and that over a ten year 
period three times more police officers were killed responding to 
230. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1988).
233. See, e.g., Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2009).
234. Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 878 (9th Cir. 2016). 
235. Id. at 880-81. 
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domestic violence calls than those responding to burglary calls.236
None of these studies establish any quantitative probability that 
perpetrators of domestic violence use or carry weapons; they merely 
establish the undeniable fact that perpetrators of domestic violence 
sometimes carry weapons and sometimes pose a risk to police 
officers.237
The court did cite one seemingly useful study: a Bureau of 
Justice report covering seven years, which concluded that 15% of 
domestic violence attacks involved a weapon.238 But this statistic is 
almost certainly too crude to be useful. Like “burglary” or “narcotics 
trafficking,” the crime of domestic violence encompasses many 
different kinds of behavior—some of them probably linked to a high 
likelihood of weapons possession and some linked to a relatively low 
likelihood.239 In order to effectively use statistics, courts will need 
more sophisticated and detailed data, which can be applied to the 
facts of the specific case—did the alleged domestic violence occur at 
home or in a public place? What percentage of individuals living in 
the neighborhood possess firearms? Are the police responding at 
night or during the daytime? This type of detailed data needs to be 
developed so that it can be used by the courts—without it, courts 
may identify these factors as relevant but then apply their own 
flawed intuition as to how each factor affects the ultimate question of 
reasonable suspicion.
236. Id. at 898 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. The regular inability of courts to effectively and accurately use statistics 
has led some commentators to argue against quantifying legal standards such as 
probable cause because judges are not generally skilled at mathematics and 
statistical analysis. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable 
Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 951 (2009); Kerr, supra note 146, at 132. However, as 
noted below, courts already use statistical evidence to some extent in evaluating 
reliability of different tools used by law enforcement officers. See infra notes 238
and accompanying text. Courts also use statistical evidence in evaluating and 
applying expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 
(1993). Furthermore, since judges are “repeat players” in reviewing reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause determinations, they will develop an expertise with 
statistics in the probable cause context as the results of predictive algorithms become 
more widespread. See Minzner, supra note 237, at 954-55.
238. Dillard, 818 F.3d at 896-97 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-99 7 (Oct. 2001), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/ipva99.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH2V-UQ4G]). 
239. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this in its opinion, noting that 
“domestic violence calls vary widely in the actual threats they pose to officers and 
others.” Dillard, 818 F.3d at 881 (majority opinion). 
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Of course, even if better data were available, the data would be 
insufficient without a quantitative standard to judge it against. 
Assume that the court had access to a database that stated that of all 
the domestic violence calls in this neighborhood during this time of 
day in the past five years, 19.2% of the suspects were armed when 
the police arrived. Would that constitute reasonable suspicion? If not, 
how close is it—close enough that a suspicious movement by the 
suspect is enough to put the risk across the line?240 Without a 
quantified definition of reasonable suspicion, judges are unable to 
answer these questions, and so instead they create an inaccurate 
binary distinction among different types of crimes. 
Thus, we need to set a quantified percentage chance for 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. As we saw earlier, judges 
appear to have widely divergent views as to this question, with 
survey results varying widely but averaging at 30.8% for reasonable 
suspicion and 44.5% for probable cause.241 The Supreme Court has 
implied242—and lower courts have stated243—that the probable cause 
standard does not mean “more probable than not,” which places the 
probable cause standard at less than 50%. Most commentators also 
agree that probable cause is something close to but just less than 
50%,244 while scattered evidence from prosecutors and law 
enforcement point to numbers between 40% and 51%.245
240. Here is an example of where Bayesian analysis would be useful—courts 
would start with a 15% baseline and then add in other factors to increase or decrease 
the likelihood. See infra notes 276-277 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. The median numbers 
were 30% for reasonable suspicion and 50% for probable cause.
242. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (stating that the “[f]inely 
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of 
the evidence . . . have no place” in determining whether probable cause exists). The 
Supreme Court also stated that probable cause represents only “a fair probability” 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, which implies something less 
than 50%. Id. at 246. A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that probable cause 
does not require that the fact being asserted be “more likely true than false.” Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 1983).
244. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 801 n.62 (listing numerous 
commentators, most of whom agree that the probable cause standard is less than 
more-probable-than-not); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds 
on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 338-39 (2004) (setting probable cause at a 
range of 40-49% but warning against too much precision); Daniel A. Crane, 
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 356 (2011) (noting that 
practitioners and commentators estimate probable cause to be “in the 40-45 percent 
range”). But see Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 211, at 1082-83
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One way to derive a specific number for these standards is to 
reverse engineer the stops and searches that have been approved 
under the current law. In other words, we can measure the hit rates 
for stops and searches that courts have approved using the traditional 
standards. This should provide us with a number that is at least above 
the minimum level of suspicion that is required. For example, if 
across the country, courts approve of 100,000 probable cause 
searches and police find contraband in 45,000 of those searches, we 
can know that generally a prediction which is 45% accurate is at 
least high enough to satisfy the probable cause standard. 
Unfortunately, there are not many statistics available, but we 
do have some actual data from the real world that can be used as a 
starting point. For example, the district court in the Floyd case held 
that the Terry stops in New York City in the early 2000s were often 
conducted without reasonable suspicion. These stops had a 12% hit 
rate; thus, the Floyd judge apparently considers a 12% rate to be too 
low.246 In contrast, we know that before the New York Police 
Department began its aggressive stop-and-frisk policy, its hit rate for 
Terry stops was a more respectable 21%.247
Reviewing probable cause searches of automobiles provides 
some real-world data as to the percentage chance necessary to 
establish probable cause. An independent review of the San Antonio 
police showed that their probable cause automobile searches resulted 
in a hit rate of 35.1%.248 As part of a settlement of a federal civil 
(placing the current probable cause level at 50% and the reasonable suspicion level 
at 30%). Many commentators agree with the courts and say that probable cause 
should not be quantified. See, e.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (arguing that “we should fear any attempt to 
co-opt mathematical concepts to solve the probable cause riddle”); Grano, supra
note 214, at 469 (arguing for a “commonsense approach,” not a mathematical 
approach, to probable cause). 
245. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth 
Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 680 (2005) (quoting a senior Assistant United States 
Attorney who estimated the number at 40%); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and 
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 783 (2003) 
(quoting an FBI attorney who set the number at 51%).
246. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).
247. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html?pagewanted= 
all [https://perma.cc/L75B-A7AR].
248. See JOHN C. LAMBERTH, RACIAL PROFILING DATA ANALYSIS STUDY:
FINAL REPORT FOR THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT 48 tbl.8 (Dec. 2003), 
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rights action in 1995, Maryland State Troopers were required to 
report every stop and search of a car on their highways,249 which 
showed a 52.5% hit rate for probable cause searches.250 And a review 
of the Florida State Police showed a 38.2% success rate for such 
searches.251
Another way to estimate the number is to look at cases 
involving alerts by drug-sniffing dogs, which can constitute probable 
cause as long as the dog’s reliability has been established.252 Thus, 
when a court needs to determine whether a positive alert by a drug 
dog is sufficient to establish probable cause, the Supreme Court has 
instructed the reviewing judge to consider the training and past
performance of the drug dog in controlled testing environments.253
Lower courts have already (albeit grudgingly) approved specific 
numerical success rates for drug dogs as sufficient to establish that 
the dog’s positive alert creates probable cause, holding that accuracy 
rates of 50%,254 55%,255 58%,256 and 60%257 were all sufficient to 
satisfy the probable cause standard.258
On the other hand, Professor Max Minzner points out that the 
success rate for search warrants, which allegedly use the same 
probable cause standard, are much higher—somewhere between 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/faip/san-antonio-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDV7-
HS2G].
249. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 56, at 658.
250. Id. at 674 tbl.9.
251. See Minzner, supra note 237, at 925.
252. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). Of course, the Harris 
Court repeated the admonition that the probable cause inquiry in the drug dog 
context should be a totality of the circumstances test, including not just the drug 
dog’s reliability but also whether the handler gave inappropriate cues or whether the 
dog was working under unfamiliar conditions. Id. at 1057-58. Below we discuss the 
method for courts to combine the specific quantified numbers from tools (such as 
drug dogs or predictive algorithms) with other factors. See infra Section III.B.2.
253. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057-58.
254. United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007).
255. United States v. Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010).
256. United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011).
257. United States v. Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007).
258. See also United States v. Sanchez-Tamayo, No. 1:10-CR-0532-JOF-
JFK, 2011 WL 7767740, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2011) (noting that courts have 
approved a drug dog reliability rate of “approximately 50%-60%” as sufficient to 
establish probable cause). But see United States v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting probable cause finding even though the drug dog had a 
65% success rate).
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84% and 97%.259 Although this dramatic disparity between different 
applications of the probable cause standard makes it more 
challenging to determine the “proper” number through reverse 
engineering, it provides yet another compelling reason to quantify 
the standard. Are courts being too lenient in reviewing probable 
cause for warrantless searches, or are they requiring too high a 
showing for warrant applications? Or perhaps we want two different 
standards, one for the on-the-spot decisions made by police officers, 
and one for the greater legitimacy and presumed legality of search 
warrants? None of these questions can be truly addressed until the 
probable cause standard is quantified.
From this brief review of the available data, we can see that hit 
rates for stops and searches vary depending on the jurisdiction and 
even on the context in which the standard is applied. Thus, if we 
want to reverse engineer percentages for reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause from the existing standards, we will need data from a 
much broader set of studies. However, even the small amount of data 
that we have so far confirms the estimates of commentators and 
courts that the number for probable cause is somewhere between 
40% and 50%.260 There is very little data on the success rate for stop 
and frisks that have been approved by courts, but the Floyd case 
implies that 12% is too low,261 and we know that the number has to 
be significantly less than the 40% to 50% range for probable cause.
In one sense, the use of predictive algorithms to establish 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not so revolutionary. The 
Supreme Court has not been averse to using statistical data in other 
Fourth Amendment contexts. For example, when the Court was 
determining whether a drunk driving checkpoint was “reasonable” 
under the special needs doctrine, it noted that the checkpoint resulted 
259. Minzner, supra note 237, at 922-23. These rates may be inflated 
somewhat because some of the jurisdictions that were studied involved police 
officers who did not return their warrants after the search, presumably because 
nothing was received. Id. at 923 n.38. Even taking into account this possibility, 
warrant success rates still ranged between 46% and 93%. Id. This higher number 
does not necessarily mean that courts are setting a higher bar for probable cause in 
warrant applications; it could be that probable cause is always set at, say, 40% for 
any kind of search, and that most warrant applications achieve a much higher level 
of success because law enforcement officers want to ensure they get approved when 
they take the time and expend the resources to apply for a warrant. Id. at 922.
260. See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
261. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
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in a 1.6% hit rate for drunk drivers262 and also that similar 
checkpoints around the country had a 1% hit rate.263 And as noted 
above, lower courts already routinely evaluate the reliability of 
certain tools, such as drug dogs, that are used to demonstrate 
probable cause.264 The need for courts to use success rates to evaluate 
probable cause will only increase as sophisticated investigative 
technologies such as facial recognition software or gun detectors 
become more widely used. In a sense, predictive algorithms will be 
doctrinally no different from these other tools that are already being 
used to establish probable cause. 
2. Using the Number
Once a number is set for reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause, the next step is to decide whether the results from the 
predictive algorithms will be determinative of the outcome or 
whether they will merely be one of a number of factors used by 
officers and judges. As an example, take Professor Andrew 
Ferguson’s modern-day recreation of Detective McFadden observing 
John Terry on the streets of Cleveland:
[McFadden] observes John Terry and, using facial recognition technology, 
identifies him and begins to investigate using big data. Detective 
McFadden learns through a database search that Terry has a prior criminal 
record, including a couple of convictions and a number of arrests. 
McFadden learns, through pattern-matching links, that Terry is an 
associate (a “hanger on”) of a notorious, violent local gangster—Billy 
Cox—who had been charged with several murders. McFadden also learns 
that Terry has a substance abuse problem and is addicted to drugs.265
Now let us take the next step and assume that the detective 
plugs all of John Terry’s background information into a predictive 
algorithm, which tells him that John Terry has a 1% chance of being 
involved in criminal activity at any given time during the day. This 
result would certainly not be sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion. Then our modern Detective McFadden could do some 
more quick research through the police database and add in some 
other factors; for example, that Terry has multiple prior convictions 
for armed robbery of commercial establishments, and license plate 
262. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990). 
263. Id. at 455.
264. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (referencing Florida v. 
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057-58 (2013)); Goldberg, supra note 148, at 828.
265. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 377.
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data connects Terry to prior commercial robberies in this area.266
This, combined with the earlier information about Terry, tells the 
detective that Terry has a 5% chance of being armed with an illegal 
weapon at any given time. We still do not have anything like 
reasonable suspicion. Indeed, it is unlikely that mere background 
information on a suspect could ever rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion—this is akin to saying there are certain people who are so 
suspicious that there is always reasonable grounds to believe they are 
engaging in criminal activity anytime they are seen in public.267
Regardless of how high the prediction is based on the 
background information alone, Detective McFadden cannot legally 
have reasonable suspicion at this point because he has not yet 
considered any individualized conduct on the part of Terry. So 
Detective McFadden must incorporate Terry’s individualized 
conduct into the calculus. As it turns out, the detective sees Terry 
pacing back and forth outside a commercial establishment multiple 
times, looking in the window, and then conferring with another 
individual.268 However, the modern-day Detective McFadden has 
two options. He can take the 5% chance that Terry is carrying an 
illegal weapon and then incorporate that into his own subjective 
calculation, combining that factor with his own observations of Terry 
pacing, looking, and conferring.269 Or he can simply input these 
observations into the algorithm, which would then automatically 
combine these observations along with other data in order to give a 
percentage chance that the suspect was in fact involved in criminal 
activity. The first is an example of using the predictive algorithm as a 
factor; the second is an example of the “outcome determinative” 
model.
266. Id. at 378. 
267. See id. Of course, once predictive algorithms become more 
sophisticated, we will have a better idea about how high this percentage could be 
based on only background information. However, because of the particularized 
suspicion requirement, even if background information alone took us to the required 
threshold, reasonable suspicion would still not exist.
268. The actual Detective McFadden used these observations alone to arrive 
at reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
269. This is the method suggested by Professor Ferguson, who notes that a 
modern-day Detective McFadden can add the personal observations to the 
information he gathered from the various police databases to make his finding of 
reasonable suspicion “easier and, likely, more reliable.” Ferguson, supra note 12, at 
377-78. As explained below, infra notes 277-280 and accompanying text, this will 
require Detective McFadden to engage in a Bayesian analysis, using 5% as a prior 
probability and then adding in his observations to adjust that probability upwards. 
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From this basic example, we can see that the “outcome 
determinative” option has a number of advantages. First, it will be 
simpler for officers and judges to apply, since it will not require 
individual officers and judges to process numerical probabilities; the
algorithm will literally do all the processing itself and give the 
decision-maker an exact number. The predictive algorithm will 
(presumably) use statistics from thousands of previous cases in order 
to establish whether the relevant facts create the level of suspicion 
necessary to reach reasonable suspicion or probable cause. These 
results (and thus the algorithm itself) can be periodically tested every 
few months to ensure they are still reliable—and as part of that 
testing, the algorithm can be adjusted to give different weights to 
different types of data or even to add or remove certain types of data 
altogether. Second, the outcome determinative model will minimize 
the potentially biased factors that human decision-makers apply in 
making these determinations. Both reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause require the officer to show specific, objective facts to 
support their conclusion,270 and forcing police officers to input these 
specific facts into the algorithm will make it harder for them to 
consciously or subconsciously use factors based on race. 
The purely determinative model could even work in cases 
where the police officers and judges need to evaluate an informant’s 
reliability to make a probable cause determination. For example, 
assume that a reliable algorithm is created to predict the chance that 
drugs will be found at a certain location. It requires five different 
variables in order to produce a result, and three of these data points 
are particularized with respect to the suspect’s observed behavior. 
None of these data points are related, either directly or indirectly, to 
race, religion, or any other protected class. Assume that a police 
officer has personal knowledge of all of these factors and inputs 
them into the software, which predicts a 75% chance that drugs will 
be found at the location. Given these facts, a court will almost 
certainly find that probable cause exists and a search warrant should 
be issued.
How would the model work if the police officer does not have 
any personal knowledge about the case, and instead her affidavit 
quotes an informant who provides the information about all five 
270. Reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articulable facts.” Terry,
392 U.S. at 21. Probable cause requires “facts and circumstances within their [the 
arresting officers’] knowledge.” Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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variables? Once again, all five variables are entered into the 
software, and the algorithm predicts a 75% chance that drugs will be 
found at the location, assuming that the information is correct. How 
can the algorithm (and thus the judge) take into account the 
inevitable reliability questions that accompany the use of 
informants? In order to preserve the purely determinative model, the 
software must be designed so that the credibility of the informant can 
be taken into account as part of the algorithm. In many cases, this 
would be feasible. Generally, search warrant applications only have a 
few different categories of informants: known informants who have 
provided accurate information in the past, known informants who 
have never provided information before, anonymous informants, etc. 
Thus, these specific categories could be inputs into the software, so 
that after each relevant factor is entered, the algorithm would ask 
about the source of the fact—did it come from personal observation 
by the affiant police officer or from an informant; and if from an 
informant, how much is known about the informant and his prior 
track record?271 These categories would be at least as specific as the 
descriptions currently used by police officers in search warrant 
affidavits.
Any outcome determinative model in this context will require a 
far more sophisticated algorithm, with many more potential inputs 
for the different behaviors that might be observed. And in designing 
these algorithms, the programmers will need to stay away from the 
vague factors that currently cause so much unreliability and are open 
to abuse, such as “furtive movements” or “acting suspiciously.”272
Other inputs, such as “suspicious bulge” or “nervous behavior,” 
which could conceivably refer to specific facts that indicate the 
presence of criminal activity, may need to be defined with more 
specific language. And the inputs need to include potentially 
exculpatory information as well, in order to ensure that the algorithm 
complies with the “totality of the circumstances” requirement of the 
probable cause determination.273
Given these practical problems, it is unlikely that any 
predictive algorithm could ever be designed that contains every 
possible type of specific behavior that a police officer might use in 
making a reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination. 
Some predictive algorithms could be designed in certain basic, often-
271. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 800. 
272. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
273. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 392. 
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repeated scenarios (observations made of individuals exiting 
buildings where drugs are being sold, observations made during 
routine traffic stops, etc.),274 but the potential range of observed 
activity is simply too broad to conceive of a world in which every 
possible relevant factor is accounted for in the computer 
programming. And in some cases the police officer or judge may 
have her own opinion about the reliability of an informant that is not 
accurately captured by the five or six traditional categories that are 
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unacceptable to take human beings completely out of the loop, since 
this would require police officers and judges to ignore information 
(whether inculpatory or exculpatory) that is highly probative to the 
reasonable suspicion/probable cause determination.
Thus, there will be some situations in which the predictive 
algorithm is merely one of the factors that the judge considers. In 
these cases, the judge will need to incorporate the conclusions of the 
predictive algorithm alongside other factors. We will call these 
“independent” factors to indicate that they are above and beyond the 
factors used by the algorithm. For example, assume that the 
algorithm uses five different inputs and predicts a 25% likelihood 
that drugs will be found at a given location. The judge also knows 
about three independent factors that on their own do not quite rise to 
the level of probable cause. The judge will be provided with the 25% 
prediction by the software. If the predictive algorithm is meant to be 
one of the many factors that she considers, she would then need to 
combine the 25% from the algorithm and the unquantified “almost-
but-not-quite” factors from her own judgment. How does she balance 
the specific number from the algorithm with her own intuitive 
conclusion? Does she have to quantify her “almost-but-not-quite” 
conclusion? Assume she can do this (and presumably judges would 
get better at this task with practice), and she quantifies her subjective 
conclusion at a 30% likelihood. How much weight does she give to 
her 30% compared to the 25% from the algorithm?
In order to accurately combine the results from the predictive 
algorithm with other factors, we need to take two steps. First, in 
order to avoid double counting, we need to separate the factors that 
have already been considered by the algorithm from the factors that 
have not.275 The transparency that we already require from these 
algorithms should make this task easier; the decision-maker will be 
274. Id. at 406. 
275. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 833. 
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able to review the factors that have already been considered by the 
algorithm and then remove those from her own independent analysis. 
Second, the decision-maker must use the predictive algorithm 
as the starting point and then adjust the percentage chance up or 
down as she adds in the independent factors. One method of doing 
this is to apply Bayes’ theorem, which is a process of combining 
known probabilities with new evidence in order to create a new, 
updated probability.276 The predictive algorithm would provide the 
decision-maker with a base rate or prior probability that criminal 
activity is present, and then the decision-maker would apply the 
probability of criminal activity based on the relevant evidence that 
was not considered by the predictive algorithm (known as the 
“current probability”).277 This extra evidence could include personal 
observations on the part of the police officer (assuming those 
observations were not taken into account by the algorithm already) 
or extra information about the reliability of the informant that was 
not accounted for by the algorithm. 
As an example, let’s return to the modern-day version of 
Detective McFadden and John Terry.278 We know from our
algorithm (based only on background information about John Terry) 
that there is a 5% chance that Terry is carrying an illegal weapon at 
276. For an example of Bayes’s theorem being applied in a legal context, see 
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict 
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 247, 255-56 (1990).
277. Bayes’ theorem can be expressed mathematically as: P = xy/[xy +z(1-
x)]. Id. P is the number we are trying to calculate, known as the “posterior 
probability”—that is, the updated probability that a certain fact is true; in this case, it 
is the odds that criminal activity is occurring or that contraband will be found if the 
search is conducted. x is the “prior probability”—the probability that a certain fact is 
true before the extra information is added; in this case, the odds of criminal activity 
or contraband that are calculated by the predictive algorithm based on all the factors 
that it takes into consideration. y is the probability that if the fact is true, then the 
extra information will be present; in this case, the odds that the independent pieces 
of information not considered by the algorithm exist because the defendant is 
engaged in criminal activity or contraband is present. And z is the probability that 
the fact is not true given the extra information; in this case, the chance that given 
that all the independent pieces of information are true, there is no criminal activity 
or contraband (i.e., there is a perfectly innocent explanation for all of the 
independent pieces of information). Obviously the decision-maker will have to 
estimate y and z, but this is not too different from what police officers and judges 
already do—only in this case they will have a much more accurate base rate to start 
from.
278. See supra note 265 and accompanying text; Ferguson, supra note 12, at 
377-79.
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any given time. Detective McFadden then observes him pacing, 
looking, and conferring and realizes this is exactly the kind of 
behavior that he would expect a potential robber to engage in before 
committing the crime.279 Thus, Detective McFadden estimates that a 
person who is planning a robbery is 90% likely to engage in the kind 
of behavior that Terry is currently engaging in. And although the 
detective realizes that there are some innocent explanations for this 
kind of behavior (perhaps Terry is window shopping and then 
conferring with his friend about what to buy), the fact that Terry has 
repeated this behavior multiple times means that the odds of him not 
planning a robbery are only about 10%. Given these estimates, the 
detective can complete a Bayesian calculation (or, more likely, input 
these estimates into a simple calculator that will then conduct the 
Bayesian calculation) and determine that the chances that Terry is 
engaged in criminal activity are 32.1%.280 Assuming that courts set 
the standard for reasonable suspicion at around 20% to 25%, this 
would be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
In contrast, assume that our modern Detective McFadden, like 
the real-life Detective McFadden, did not have any information 
about John Terry’s background. Instead, he merely observed Terry’s 
suspicious behavior. Under Bayes’ theorem, our base rate would be 
much lower. Perhaps we recognize that this is a high crime 
neighborhood, so we know that 1% of the population is carrying an 
illegal weapon at any given time. If Detective McFadden makes the 
same observations as before and he calculates the same odds of 
criminal activity based on those observations, the chances that Terry 
is engaged in criminal activity drops to only 8.3%.281 In other words, 
the lower base rate from the lack of big data makes the detective’s 
prediction of criminal activity much less accurate. 
Thus, even if predictive algorithms are not outcome 
determinative, using a more statistical approach to determine 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will allow police officers and 
judges to incorporate more reliable base rates into their calculations. 
Predictive algorithms will also help these decision-makers avoid a 
279. Some robbers might simply barge in without investigating the location 
first, but most robbers would want to take a good look at the location, looking to see 
how many people are present, where the cash register or other valuables are kept, 
and (in the modern age) whether there are any security cameras inside. See
Ferguson, supra note 12, at 378.
280. Applying Bayes’ theorem: P = .05*.9/[.05*.9 + .1*(1-.05)] = .321.
281. Again, applying Bayes’ theorem: P = .01*.9/[.01*.9 + .1*(1-.01)] = 
.043.
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common problem when making predictions: ignoring or 
undervaluing the base rate. As can be seen from our above example, 
a very low base rate or prior probability for potential criminal 
activity means that even very suspicious independent factors might 
not result in a very high resulting probability. Studies have shown 
that individuals who make predictions frequently undervalue or even 
ignore base rates and give too much weight to the independent 
factors that they are presented with.282 Forcing police officers and 
judges to incorporate the base rate in making their calculations 
would be another benefit of using a quantified system of criminal 
procedure.
Of course, the more we allow the decision-makers to use 
independent factors, the more we lose the benefits of predictive 
algorithms, such as the increased accuracy and the mitigation of 
subjective and potentially biased human input. For example, when 
Detective McFadden enters in his own probability estimates into the 
Bayesian calculation, he may underestimate the chance that Terry 
has an innocent explanation for his conduct because Terry is 
African-American, and the detective has an irrational implicit bias 
against African-Americans. This would result in a higher prediction 
of criminal activity for Terry than it would for a white person with 
the same background engaging in the same activity. Thus, we should 
design our algorithms to avoid the need for independent factors as 
much as possible, since the biases in the algorithms can be detected 
and minimized.
CONCLUSION
Big data’s predictive algorithms have the potential to 
revolutionize the way police investigate crime and the way the courts 
regulate the police. For centuries, courts have been crafting legal 
standards for police officers who were making clinical judgments 
based on experience and intuition. The imprecision and subjectivity 
of these legal standards were a necessary evil—they were required 
given the subjective factors that were used by the police, but their 
accuracy could not be tested, they made the system less transparent, 
and they opened the door to vastly inconsistent and frequently 
discriminatory results. With the rise of big data’s predictive 
algorithms, we have an opportunity to increase the accuracy and the 
transparency of the way we apply the standards and of the standards 
282. Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 276, at 256.
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themselves, making the system more efficient, more fair, and more 
open. 
In order to reap these benefits, we need to ensure that the 
predictive algorithms are race neutral and that they take into account 
individual suspicion. This may require new types of algorithms that 
are specifically designed for determining reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause. It will certainly require that the algorithms be 
transparent, so that reviewing courts can understand what factors the 
algorithm is using. More controversially, we need to update the 
definition of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to include 
quantifiable standards. Although courts have shown a strong 
aversion quantifying standards in the past, the benefits to such a 
change far outweigh the costs. We have seen that some courts, 
recognizing this fact, have already started to experiment with using 
quantified standards when evaluating some of the factors put forward 
by law enforcement officers or when evaluating the tools that these 
officers use in determining probable cause.
To be sure, a system of mechanical predictive algorithms and 
quantified legal standards will not be perfect. It will probably be 
impossible to scrub all residue of racial discrimination from the 
existing databases, and police officers and judges will almost 
certainly make mistakes when trying to use the predictive algorithms 
as base rates and then adding their own independent observations. 
And the predictive algorithms themselves will still make mistakes, 
and thus will not always be as accurate as we would like. But the 
current system includes the implicit and sometimes explicit biases of 
police officers and judges; vague standards that can be manipulated 
by police officers, which are more or less incomprehensible to lay 
people; and accuracy rates (when they can be measured) that vary 
wildly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The time has come for courts 
to embrace the enhanced precision and transparency that big data has 
to offer.
